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Daily Morning Meeting

v1.0.1

每日早会自动执行技能。多Agent抓取全网热点,整理成早会简报发送给CEO。

0· 41·1 current·1 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
Security Scan
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OpenClawOpenClaw
Suspicious
medium confidence
Purpose & Capability
Name/description, SKILL.md, and code all implement fetching news, deduping, saving a markdown brief, and sending via the 'message' tool — so the core capability matches. However: (1) the SKILL.md claims 'Multi-Agent' orchestration and lists 'agent-orchestrator' as a dependency, but neither main.py nor run.js actually call an orchestrator; (2) SKILL.md and code assume a Windows user path (C:\Users\Admin\.qclaw\workspace\) despite claiming cross-platform OS support. These are coherence issues (sloppy engineering or mis-documentation), not direct proof of malicious intent.
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Instruction Scope
Runtime instructions and the code perform expected actions (search via openclaw web_search, write a file, call message tool). Concerns: both scripts write to a hard-coded user workspace path (C:\Users\Admin...), which may be incorrect on non-Windows hosts and could overwrite user files if altered; the Python version uses subprocess.run with shell=True to execute openclaw CLI commands (shell invocation increases risk if inputs are manipulated); the SKILL.md manual run example uses the Windows path, which is inconsistent with cross-platform claim. The scripts do not read other user files or environment variables beyond these operations.
Install Mechanism
No install spec — it's instruction-only with included code files. Nothing is downloaded or installed during an install step, so there is no remote code fetch risk in the install phase.
Credentials
The skill declares no required environment variables or credentials and the code does not attempt to read secrets or unrelated environment variables. The only sensitive action is sending messages to a recipient labeled 'CEO' via the platform 'message' tool; this requires trusting that tool's authorization but is proportional to the stated purpose.
Persistence & Privilege
always is false and default agent invocation is allowed — normal for skills. The skill does not request permanent system-wide presence or modify other skills' configurations. It writes files into a workspace directory (expected behavior for a briefing generator).
What to consider before installing
This skill appears to do what it claims (fetch news, format a briefing, and send it), but it has sloppy/incoherent elements you should resolve before installing on production systems. Specifically: - Confirm provenance: the Source/Homepage are unknown; prefer skills from a trusted author or with a public repo. - Inspect/modify save_path: both scripts hard-code C:\Users\Admin\.qclaw\workspace\ — change this to a correct, intended path for your environment to avoid accidental writes or collisions (and update the SKILL.md example for non-Windows hosts). - Verify the 'message' tool and recipient: ensure the message tool is authorized to send on behalf of the agent and that 'CEO' maps to the intended account; otherwise the skill could send data unexpectedly. - Review dependencies: SKILL.md lists qclaw-cron-skill and agent-orchestrator, but the included code does not invoke an orchestrator. If you plan to use cron/agent orchestration, prefer wiring scheduling/orchestration externally rather than trusting undocumented internal behavior. - Shell invocation hygiene: the Python script builds commands and calls subprocess.run(shell=True). If you adapt the skill to accept user-provided inputs (queries/recipients), ensure inputs are sanitized or avoid shell=True to prevent command injection. - Test in a sandbox: run the skill in an isolated environment, verify it only calls the expected openclaw tools, check what the message tool transmits (media file contents), and confirm no unexpected endpoints are contacted. If you can't verify the author's identity or the behavior of the dependent tools (web_search, message, agent-orchestrator), treat this as untrusted and avoid granting it access to real CEO communications or sensitive environments.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

Runtime requirements

🌅 Clawdis
OSLinux · macOS · Windows

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