T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:53
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 53-57 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependency and unverified package source **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ## Dependencies ```bash pip install requests ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation command retrieves whichever version of the `requests` package the configured Python package index currently serves. The project provides no version constraint, lock file, package hash, or trusted-index requirement. Although `requests` is a legitimate package and no malicious dependency was observed in the audited files, this installation process does not produce a reproducible or cryptographically verified dependency set. A compromised upstream release, package repository, dependency account, or configured package mirror could supply altered code. That code may run through package installation behavior or when `scripts/subenum.py` imports `requests`. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the relevant package release channel, repository account, or package index/mirror configured on the user's system. 2. The attacker causes the index to serve a malicious or compromised dependency version. 3. A user follows the documented command: ```bash pip install requests ``` 4. Pip resolves and installs the uncontrolled package version from that index. 5. Malicious package logic executes during installation or when `scripts/subenum.py` imports `requests` at lines 20-24. 6. The payload runs with the privileges of the user or automation process that installed or launched the Skill. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's privileges. The resulting access may include files, environment variables, network credentials, and services available to that account. The scope does not inherently exceed the installer or runtime account's privileges, and exploitation depends on compromise or manipulati ...[truncated 43 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `requests` and all transitive dependencies to reviewed versions using a lock file or fully pinned requirements file. 2. Record and enforce cryptographic hashes, for example: ```bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Generate hashes from artifacts obtained through a trusted dependency-review process. 4. Use an explicitly controlled package index or internal dependency mirror rather than relying on arbitrary user-level pip configuration. 5. Add automated dependency vulnerability and integrity scanning to the release process. 6. Periodically update pins through a reviewed process instead of using unconstrained latest versions.