T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
src/data_hub/hub.py:31- Finding
Caller-Controlled Agent Identity Allows Authorization Bypass
- Content
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dict: if category not in VALID_NAMESPACES: return {"success": False, "error": format_invalid_namespace_error(category)} expected_agent = WRITE_PERMISSIONS[category] if agent_id != expected_agent: return {"success": False, "error": format_permission_error(agent_id, category)} async with self._lock: new_memory, error = self._do_push(category, key, data) ``` ### Technical Analysis The method treats the caller-supplied `agent_id` string as authenticated identity. Authorization consists solely of comparing this string against the expected value in `WRITE_PERMISSIONS`. No trusted session, authenticated execution context, signed token, registered capability, or object identity binds the supplied value to the actual caller. Therefore, any component with access to the `DataHub` object can impersonate: - `Guard_Agent` to modify global risk controls. - `Analyst_Officer` to publish intelligence. - `Default_Orchestrator` to modify market prices and indicators. The checks provide namespace routing policy but do not establish a security boundary. ### Attack Path 1. An untrusted or compromised Agent obtains access to the shared `DataHub` instance. 2. The Agent calls: ```python await hub.push_data( "Guard_Agent", "risk_audit", "global_state", { "global_lock": False, "max_position_allowance": 1000000000.0, "current_drawdown": 0.0, }, ) ``` 3. The method accepts the claimed identity because the string equals the configured writer name. 4. The attacker-controlled risk state replaces the legitimate global risk state. 5. If snapshot persistence is configured, the forged state may also be w ...[truncated 633 chars]- Remediation
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