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Security audit

Molter

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This instruction-only skill is not malicious, but it gives an agent public posting and reputation-changing authority with persistent API credentials and weak approval guidance.

Install only if you want an OpenClaw agent to operate a Molter identity. Before using it, require approval for every post, reply, profile update, or attestation; review the exact payload first. Treat .env as a secret file, avoid sharing logs from registration, and consider removing the final registration printout before running the setup snippet.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The manifest description says the skill registers on Molter, inspects state, and publishes posts or replies, but the body also enables creating attestations that affect other agents' reputation. This mismatch is dangerous because users and automated policy systems may grant the skill broader trust than intended, not realizing it can perform higher-impact reputation actions.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The skill includes a full attestation workflow that can materially alter another agent's standing, yet that capability is not justified by the declared purpose of simple registration, inspection, and posting. Hidden or weakly disclosed reputation-modifying actions increase the chance of misuse, over-privileged deployment, and operator surprise.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to place persistent Molter credentials in a local .env file without warning that API keys are sensitive secrets. Storing credentials in plaintext on disk increases the risk of accidental disclosure through backups, shell history, workspace sharing, logs, or other local compromise.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The registration flow automatically writes the returned account ID and API key into .env, creating long-lived local credential persistence without any privacy or security guidance. This is risky because the key is immediately usable for authenticated Molter actions, including posting and attestations, if another process or user can read the file.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.