T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Error
- Location
- SKILL.md:17
- Finding
- Unpinned Global Installation of a Wallet-Enabled Third-Party Package## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, line 17 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned third-party dependency **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash which clawdex || npm install -g clawdex@latest ``` The installed CLI is subsequently instructed to access sensitive credentials and wallet material: ```bash clawdex onboarding \ --jupiter-api-key "$JUPITER_API_KEY" \ --rpc "${SOLANA_RPC_URL:-https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com}" \ --wallet ~/.config/solana/id.json \ --json ``` It is also authorized to execute real token swaps: ```bash clawdex swap --in SOL --out USDC --amount 0.01 --yes --json ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs the agent to install the mutable `clawdex@latest` package globally. It does not pin an audited version, verify an integrity hash or package signature, use a lockfile, or validate package provenance. Because the `latest` tag can resolve to different package contents over time, the code executed during installation and subsequent CLI operations may differ from what was originally reviewed. Global npm installation may also execute package lifecycle scripts and places the package in a broadly available system-level tool location. The risk is amplified because the installed CLI is later provided with a Jupiter API key and the path to a Solana wallet key file. It is also invoked with `--yes` to execute real transactions. A compromised upstream release or dependency could read sensitive files, transmit credentials, substitute transaction parameters, or alter transaction-signing behavior. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `clawdex` npm package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the package publishing account. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release and assigns it to the mutable `latest` tag. 3. On a system where `clawdex` is absent, the skill runs: ```bash npm install -g clawdex@latest ``` 4. Malicious package installation hooks or C ...[truncated 1258 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Replace `clawdex@latest` with an exact, audited version: ```bash npm install -g clawdex@X.Y.Z ``` 2. Verify the package's official publisher, registry origin, release provenance, and cryptographic integrity before installation. 3. Prefer a project-local, lockfile-controlled installation rather than a global installation. Commit and review the lockfile, including transitive dependency changes. 4. Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation when the package supports operation without them: ```bash npm install --ignore-scripts ``` 5. Run the CLI in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem and network permissions. 6. Avoid exposing a raw private-key file to the CLI. Prefer a hardware wallet, isolated signing service, or signer interface that requires explicit approval and does not reveal private-key material. 7. Require explicit user confirmation for the exact input mint, output mint, amount, slippage, destination accounts, and quoted minimum output before broadcasting each real swap. 8. Independently validate the serialized transaction before signing, including all program IDs, account addresses, token mints, transfer amounts, fees, and destination accounts. 9. Use a dedicated low-value trading wallet to limit the blast radius of dependency compromise. 10. Document and enforce a package-update review process rather than automatically accepting changes through the `latest` tag.