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Security audit

Huo15 Dingtalk Connector Pro

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This DingTalk connector is purpose-aligned overall, but it grants broad message-to-agent authority and can automatically upload readable local files when paths appear in agent output.

Install only if you will configure allowlists or disabled group access, avoid the unsupported pairing mode, restrict which agents/tools this channel can reach, and do not run the beta installer unless you verify the exact commit yourself. Treat this connector as able to transmit DingTalk messages, attachments, AI responses, and in some cases local files readable by the OpenClaw process.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
src/services/media.ts:1022
Finding

Arbitrary Local File Disclosure Through Agent-Generated Paths

Content
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{ const logPrefix = 'RawMedia'; const rawPathPattern = /(?:^|\s)((?:[A-Za-z]:)?[\/\\](?:[^\/\\:\*\?"<>\|\s]+[\/\\])*[^\/\\:\*\?"<>\|\s]+\.(?:mp4|avi|mov|wmv|flv|mkv|webm|mp3|wav|flac|aac|ogg|m4a|wma|pdf|doc|docx|xls|xlsx|ppt|pptx|txt|zip|rar|7z|tar|gz))(?:\s|$)/gi; const matches = Array.from(content.matchAll(rawPathPattern)); if (matches.length === 0) { return content; } for (const match of matches) { const fullMatch = match[0]; const filePath = match[1].trim(); const uploadResult = await uploadMediaToDingTalk( filePath, mediaType, oapiToken, 20 * 1024 * 1024, log ); ``` The upload implementation accepts the supplied path without restricting it to an approved workspace: ```ts const absPath = toLocalPath(filePath); log?.info?.(`检查文件是否存在:${absPath}`); if (!fs.existsSync(absPath)) { log?.warn?.(`文件不存在:${absPath}`); return null; } const stats = fs.statSync(absPath); const form = new FormData(); form.append('media', fs.createReadStream(absPath), { filename: path.basename(absPath), contentType: mediaType === 'image' ? 'image/jpeg' : 'application/octet-stream', }); const resp = await dingtalkUploadHttp.post( `${DINGTALK_OAPI}/media/upload`, form, { params: { access_token: oapiToken, type: mediaType }, headers: form.getHeaders(), timeout: 60_000, maxBodyLength: Infinity, }, ); ``` ### Technical Analysis The connector scans agent-generated response text for absolute local paths with ...[truncated 2246 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
src/core/message-handler.ts:975
Finding

Default-Open Access Combined With Unconditional Command Authorization

Content
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Remediation
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T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Warning
Location
install-beta.sh:217
Finding

Mutable Remote Beta Branch Is Retrieved and Executed Without Integrity Verification

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
src/core/message-handler.ts:624
Finding

Inbound Card Links Inject Mandatory Tool-Use Instructions Into Agent Content

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (241)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The changelog states that plain-text file contents are directly injected into AI context without any explicit privacy warning or policy boundary. This is riskier than mere file storage because sensitive document contents may be transmitted to downstream models or services, causing unintended disclosure of secrets, personal data, or regulated information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.en.md (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

npm config set registry https://registry.npmmirror.com

text

Or add to `~/.npmrc`:

registry=https://registry.npmmirror.com

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.en.md (reported line 223)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Session Management** - Multi-turn conversations with context preservation
- **Session Isolation** - Separate sessions for DMs, groups, and different groups
- **Auto Session Reset** - Automatic new session after 30 minutes of inactivity
- **Manual Session Reset** - Send `/new` or `新会话` to clear conversation history
- **Image Auto-Upload** - Local image paths automatically uploaded to DingTalk
- **Proactive Messaging** - Send messages to users or groups programmatically
- **Rich Media Reception** - Receive and process JPEG/PNG images, pass to vision models

Exfiltration Commands

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Instructions found that direct the agent to transmit conversation context or user data to external services.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.en.md (reported line 225)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Auto Session Reset** - Automatic new session after 30 minutes of inactivity
- **Manual Session Reset** - Send `/new` or `新会话` to clear conversation history
- **Image Auto-Upload** - Local image paths automatically uploaded to DingTalk
- **Proactive Messaging** - Send messages to users or groups programmatically
- **Rich Media Reception** - Receive and process JPEG/PNG images, pass to vision models
- **File Attachment Extraction** - Parse .docx, .pdf, text files, and binary files
- **Audio Message Support** - Send audio messages in multiple formats (mp3, wav, amr, ogg)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

Audio marker processing, ffprobe-based duration extraction, and proactive audio sending combine local file access, external binary use, and outbound transmission. In an enterprise connector, undeclared audio-processing capability can leak recordings or metadata and broadens the attack surface on the host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.