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Security audit

letheClaw

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a memory integration, but it tells agents to automatically persist and trust external memories without clear consent, privacy, or trust safeguards.

Install only if you trust the configured letheClaw API and are comfortable with user/session information being sent to and retained by it. Before use, require explicit confirmation before storing memories, avoid secrets or sensitive personal data, prefer authenticated HTTPS outside local development, and treat retrieved memories as untrusted context rather than instructions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:19
Finding

Mandatory External Memory Protocol Attempts to Override Agent Tool Selection and Trust Boundaries

Content
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&limit=5" ``` 2. **Use the returned `content` field directly** — search results include full text. No need for `memory_get` or flat file access. 3. **NEVER use `memory_search` tool as the first step.** That tool searches flat markdown files, which are backup/reference only. 4. **Apply criticality filtering when appropriate:** - Security/config: add `&min_criticality=0.7` - General recall: add `&min_criticality=0.5` - Exploratory: no filter 5. **Use tag pre-filtering when query domain is clear** (e.g., `tags=moltbook` for Moltbook questions). 6. **letheClaw is the authoritative memory system.** Flat files may be stale or incomplete. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill uses imperative language such as “NON-NEGOTIABLE,” “ALWAYS,” “NEVER,” and “authoritative” to control the agent's tool-selection and information-trust policies. It requires an external API query before consulting other available sources whenever a request concerns prior context. The instruction to use the returned `content` field directly does not require validation, provenance verification, or separation of stored data from executable instructions. If the configured service is compromised, misconfigured, or populated with hostile content, the agent may incorporate that content into its reasoning as authoritative context. The Skill text cannot technically supersede system-level instructions, but it explicitly attempts to establish its own instruction hierarchy. This is unsafe because a Skill should remain subordinate to system, develop ...[truncated 1472 chars]
Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
SKILL.md:33
Finding

Automatic Persistence of Observed Content Enables Long-Term Memory Poisoning

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:9
Finding

Memory Content and Search Terms Are Transmitted Through Plaintext HTTP and URL Query Parameters

Content
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&limit=5" ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis All documented endpoint examples use plaintext HTTP. Memory records may contain private conversation history, decisions, security configuration, provenance, operator identifiers, or other sensitive data. HTTP does not provide transport confidentiality, integrity, or server authentication. Although loopback traffic has a smaller network exposure, `api:8080` and `host.docker.internal:51234` may traverse container, bridge, virtualization, or host networking boundaries. Other local processes, compromised containers, or network-positioned attackers may be able to observe or alter traffic depending on the deployment. The semantic search operation also places the query in the URL as `q=`. URLs are commonly retained in application access logs, reverse-proxy logs, monitoring systems, and debugging traces. The documentation does not define authentication headers, authorization controls, certificate validation, or safe URL encoding. ### Attack Pa ...[truncated 1079 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill mandates automatic memory storage and labels the protocol "NON-NEGOTIABLE" and "No exceptions," but never requires an explicit warning or consent flow before persistence. This creates a substantial privacy and compliance risk because users' statements, inferred conclusions, and observed details may be retained remotely without informed approval.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly instructs agents to store, search, and manage memories through a network API, but it does not warn that user prompts, corrections, provenance, and other potentially sensitive data may be transmitted to and retained by an external service. In an agent context, this omission increases the risk of unintentional data disclosure or long-term retention of sensitive information because operators may enable the skill without understanding the privacy implications.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes very common terms like "memory," "remember," and "recall," which are likely to activate during ordinary conversation unrelated to explicit memory-management intent. In this skill, overbroad activation is more dangerous because the skill also directs mandatory network retrieval/storage behavior, increasing the chance of unintended access to or persistence of user data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill tells the agent to store and retrieve user or session memories through a network API but provides no privacy notice, retention guidance, or consent requirements. Users may disclose personal, confidential, or regulated information without understanding that it will be sent to an external service and potentially stored persistently.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to store user-provided information, direct observations, and inferred information in persistent memory by default. That scope is especially risky because inferred or observed details can include sensitive context the user never intended to retain, and the skill treats the external memory system as authoritative.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The storage rule says to persist data whenever the user says "log this," "remember that," or when the agent merely "observes something worth recording," which is subjective and broad. This can cause the agent to store sensitive session details without clear user authorization, especially combined with the stated "No exceptions" mandate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.