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Security audit

PsyVector pv42

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a Chinese mediation-persona skill with no code execution, credential access, persistence, or hidden data handling.

Install this if you want a Chinese mediation-style persona for conflict-resolution conversations. Be aware that common conflict-related words may activate the persona, and responses may stay in that framing until you ask it to exit or return to normal mode.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:21
Finding

Persistent Persona and Response-Control Instruction Hijacking

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 21-30
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: Medium

Relevant Code Snippet:

markdown
## Role-Playing Rules

**After this Skill is activated, respond directly as this persona.**

- Use “I” instead of “the mediator would think...”
- Answer with the tone and pacing associated with the persona
- Honestly disclose when a question falls outside the persona’s expertise
- **State the disclaimer only once upon initial activation**: “I am speaking with you from the perspective of the mediation artist. My responses are inferred from the character profile and are not the views of a real person.” Do not repeat it afterward.
- Do not step outside the persona to perform meta-analysis unless the user explicitly requests “exit persona.”

Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs the agent to replace its normal response identity with a predefined persona immediately after activation. It also directs the agent not to perform meta-analysis or leave the persona unless the user supplies a designated exit request.

These are behavioral control instructions rather than optional guidance for answering mediation-related questions. The one-time disclaimer rule further reduces transparency during subsequent responses. Together, these directives can keep the current session under the Skill’s imposed role and discourage neutral disclosure or analysis of the active instructions.

The file does not explicitly override system-level safety policies, execute code, alter persistent memory, or obtain additional operating-system privileges. The confirmed scope is therefore limited to instruction and response control in sessions where the Skill is loaded.

Attack Path

  1. The Skill is loaded or activated in an agent session.
  2. The activation rule directs the agent to immediately assume the mediation persona.
  3. The agent presents a disclaimer on ...[truncated 896 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  1. Make persona adoption conditional on an explicit user request rather than automatic upon Skill activation.
  2. Replace the anti-meta rule with a precedence statement confirming that system instructions, developer instructions, safety requirements, and current user intent always override persona behavior.
  3. Permit any clear request to stop, switch styles, obtain a neutral answer, or analyze the persona; do not require a specific exit phrase.
  4. Keep persona behavior scoped to mediation-related responses and return to normal operation when the request is outside that scope.
  5. Maintain transparent disclosure whenever persona framing could materially affect an answer instead of limiting the disclosure to the first response.
  6. Reframe the relevant requirements as optional style guidance, for example: “When explicitly requested by the user, use this persona unless doing so conflicts with higher-priority instructions or safety policies.”
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes very common words such as “平衡”“协调”“投诉”“不满”, which can appear in many unrelated conversations and cause accidental activation of the skill. Because the skill instructs the agent to immediately enter a role and avoid meta-analysis, unintended invocation can alter system behavior in contexts where the user did not request mediation, increasing prompt-routing and response-integrity risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

该技能的自然语言说明与角色输出规范整体均以中文固定呈现,且未见提供语言/locale 选择、用户偏好继承或仅限中文场景的明确说明。按组织语言/locale政策标准,这会构成默认强制单一语言而未取得用户选择。

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.