Security audit

Nocodb

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a transparent NocoDB administration CLI, but it gives an agent broad database, team, script, file-upload, and API-token powers without built-in safety checks.

Install only if you intend to let an agent administer NocoDB. Use a dedicated least-privilege token against a verified NOCODB_URL, avoid owner/admin tokens unless required, back up important data, and require explicit human approval before delete, bulk update, team, script, token, or attachment-upload commands.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 81% confidence
Finding: The skill prominently documents destructive operations such as workspace, base, table, field, view, record, and token deletion without any cautionary guidance, confirmation pattern, backup advice, or note about irreversibility. In an agent context, that increases the chance of accidental destructive actions against production NocoDB resources, especially because the commands are short, uniform, and easy to invoke programmatically.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The CLI exposes many destructive operations such as workspace, base, table, field, view, record, script, team, and token deletion with immediate execution and no confirmation, dry-run, or safety interlock. In an agent context, a prompt misunderstanding, tool misuse, or malicious instruction could cause irreversible data loss or permission disruption with a single command.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.