Tp2
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a straightforward historical weather lookup tool that sends city/date queries to the documented JisuAPI service using a user-provided API key.
Before installing, make sure you are comfortable sending the queried city/date and your JISU_API_KEY to JisuAPI over HTTPS. Keep the API key scoped to this provider and rotate it if it is exposed.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
The skill declares access to an environment variable containing an API key and necessarily performs outbound network requests, but it does not define an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates an authorization gap: a host or agent may permit broader execution than intended, making secret access and external communication less constrained and harder to audit.
The description specifies trigger examples and usage entirely in Chinese, which indicates the skill is intended to operate in a single language. There is no note offering language choice or stating that Chinese is optional, so this is a natural-language locale policy concern.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
BASE_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/weather2"
def _call_api(path: str, appkey: str, params: dict = None):
The skill sends request parameters, including user-provided city/date values and the API key, to a third-party weather service via HTTP. While the module docstring names the API provider, there is no explicit user-facing warning, confirmation, or runtime disclosure that input data will be transmitted off-system.
The only natural-language description in the file is entirely in Chinese, which can constitute a locale/language policy issue when no user opt-in or justification is provided. Nothing in the file indicates the skill is intentionally limited to Chinese-speaking users or a China-specific deployment context.
No suspicious patterns detected.