Tp2
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a straightforward invoice-checking helper that sends user-provided invoice details to JisuAPI as its advertised function.
Install only if you are comfortable sending invoice details and your JisuAPI app key to JisuAPI for verification. Avoid using it for invoices whose tax, business, or personal data you are not authorized to share with that third-party service.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
The documentation describes sending invoice identifiers, dates, amounts, check codes, and possibly taxpayer numbers to JisuAPI but does not clearly warn users that this information leaves the local environment and is shared with a third party. Because invoice data can contain sensitive commercial and personal information, lack of disclosure undermines informed consent and may violate privacy expectations or compliance requirements.
The skill advertises and operationalizes access to an environment variable API key and a remote third-party invoice verification service, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That creates a governance gap where an agent may invoke networked behavior and handle secrets without clear least-privilege constraints or user-visible authorization expectations.
The trigger language is broad enough that ordinary discussion about invoices or reimbursement could activate the skill and cause sensitive invoice fields to be processed. In this skill, that matters because activation can lead to transmission of financial/tax data to an external API, increasing privacy and data handling risk.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
INVOICE_VERIFY_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/invoiceverify/verify"
INVOICE_TYPE_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/invoiceverify/type"
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
import requests
INVOICE_VERIFY_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/invoiceverify/verify"
INVOICE_TYPE_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/invoiceverify/type"
The skill transmits invoice data, which may include sensitive financial and tax information, to a third-party API service without any user-facing disclosure or consent mechanism. Even though the transmission uses HTTPS and appears necessary for functionality, this creates a privacy and data-governance risk because users may not realize their invoice details are leaving the local environment.
The natural-language description and inline documentation are presented in Chinese, but the file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide an option for users who need another language. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a locale-policy issue.
No suspicious patterns detected.