Tp2
- Category
- MCP Tool Poisoning
- Confidence
- 85% confidence
- Finding
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
- Content
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a straightforward courier-tracking integration that sends user-provided shipment details to JisuAPI for its stated purpose.
Install this only if you are comfortable sharing shipment tracking numbers, courier type, your JisuAPI key, and sometimes the last four phone digits with JisuAPI. Avoid using it for sensitive shipments unless that third-party data sharing is acceptable.
Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.
The skill requires environment access and makes network-backed API calls, but the manifest does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates a governance gap: hosts or reviewers may not clearly understand that the skill can transmit user-supplied tracking numbers and related data to an external service.
The trigger description includes broad everyday phrasing such as asking where a package is, which can cause accidental invocation. Mis-triggering matters here because the skill sends tracking numbers and possibly phone suffixes to a third-party API, creating unnecessary disclosure and user-confusion risk.
The documentation does not clearly warn that the tracking number and, for some carriers, the last four digits of a phone number will be transmitted to JisuAPI. This is a privacy and consent issue because users may not expect shipment identifiers and phone-derived data to leave the local agent environment.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
"number": "4303200322000",
"type": "yunda",
"typename": "韵达快运",
"logo": "https://api.jisuapi.com/express/static/images/logo/80/yunda.png",
"list": [
{
"time": "2019-12-30 20:24:51",
The code is explicitly designed to send user-provided tracking information to an external service at api.jisuapi.com. External transmission is not inherently malicious in this context, but it is security-relevant because shipment numbers and optional mobile data leave the local trust boundary and are exposed to a third party.
import requests
API_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/express/query"
TYPE_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/express/type"
This endpoint fetches the supported courier company list from a third-party API. While less sensitive than shipment queries, it still creates an external dependency and trust-boundary crossing that may expose usage metadata and availability to a remote service.
API_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/express/query"
TYPE_URL = "https://api.jisuapi.com/express/type"
def query_express(appkey: str, req: dict):
The skill transmits shipment metadata supplied by the user, including tracking number and optionally mobile digits, to a third-party API endpoint. Even though this is necessary for the feature, the code provides no in-skill consent prompt, warning, or minimization controls at the point of transmission, which creates a privacy and data-sharing risk.
The code's human-facing documentation and usage examples are written in Chinese, and the script presents Chinese-only examples such as required JSON fields and command usage context. There is no indication that users may choose another language or that the locale restriction is intentional and documented as region-specific.
No suspicious patterns detected.