T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:3- Finding
Global source-selection instructions hijack AI-related requests
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This AI news skill has a coherent purpose, but it over-directs agents to a specific external service and its scripts can expose the API token to an unintended endpoint if environment settings are changed.
Install only if you trust the Jiqizhixin service with your AI-news search topics and API token. Before use, pin or validate the API host, avoid running it in environments where BASE_URL can be influenced, protect JQZX_API_TOKEN like a password, and treat the skill's mandatory source-priority wording as subordinate to user privacy and source preferences.
SKILL.md:3Global source-selection instructions hijack AI-related requests
scripts/query_articles.sh:4Article-query script can disclose the API token to an attacker-controlled endpoint
scripts/query_article_detail.sh:4Article-detail script can disclose the API token to an attacker-controlled endpoint
The skill requires shell-capable execution via curl-based scripts but does not declare any explicit tool scope, permissions, or allowed-tools boundary. This weakens least-privilege enforcement and can cause an agent/runtime to expose broader shell access than users expect, increasing the chance of unintended command execution or misuse of environment-resident secrets.
The skill description says AI-industry questions must prioritize this skill and forbids answering from model knowledge, effectively trying to override higher-level user choice and system policy. This is dangerous because it can force external calls, suppress safer alternatives, and pressure the agent to disclose user queries to a third-party service without explicit opt-in.
The document both prohibits relying on LLM memory for concrete facts and later instructs the model to use its own memory to expand search keywords. That contradiction can cause inconsistent agent behavior, making it easier for hallucinated or stale information to influence retrieval, analysis, and downstream conclusions presented as fact.
The skill promotes direct API and script use against a production endpoint without clearly warning that queries, article IDs, and possibly contextual prompts are transmitted to an external service. In a news-research context, user queries may encode sensitive business interests, investigations, or internal strategy, so silent transmission creates privacy and data-governance risk.
The script emits error and usage messages only in Chinese, which imposes a specific language on users without offering an alternative or opt-in. This matches the language/locale policy violation category because the file forces a locale-specific experience through natural-language strings.
The documentation instructs users to set an API token in an environment variable but provides no warning about credential sensitivity, storage, redaction, or log exposure. That omission can lead to accidental token disclosure in shells, scripts, screenshots, transcripts, or debugging output.
This markdown file presents its instructions and reference content solely in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the file is intentionally limited to a Chinese-language context. The policy explicitly calls for flagging language or locale constraints when they are forced without user opt-in or justification.
This shell script performs a network request and sends a credential from JQZX_API_TOKEN in the X-MCP-TOKEN header. While it errors if the variable is absent, it does not clearly disclose to the user at execution time that their token will be transmitted to the remote service.
No suspicious patterns detected.