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Security audit

Backend Engineer

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent backend and DevOps guide, but some production troubleshooting instructions could expose secrets or affect infrastructure without enough safety checks.

Review this skill carefully before installing if the agent can access Kubernetes or cloud production environments. Require explicit confirmation before execing into pods, prefer read-only diagnostics first, avoid dumping full environment variables, and redact any secrets from terminal output, logs, incident notes, and chat history.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:839
Finding

Unrestricted Environment Variable Enumeration in Kubernetes Workloads

Content
View full analysis
-- /bin/sh` — exec into container for live debugging: check env vars (`env`), DNS resolution (`nslookup`), network connectivity (`nc -zv`), disk space (`df -h`), memory (`free -m`). ``` ### Technical Analysis The troubleshooting guidance recommends executing a shell inside a Kubernetes container and running `env`. This command enumerates every environment variable available to the workload rather than checking only the configuration relevant to the incident. Container environment variables can contain database passwords, API tokens, cloud credentials, signing secrets, internal service addresses, or other sensitive configuration. Although the Skill does not direct the Agent to transmit these values to an external endpoint, unrestricted enumeration can place secrets in terminal output, Agent context, conversation history, diagnostic records, or copied incident reports. This behavior exceeds minimum privilege when troubleshooting requires only confirmation that a particular configuration variable is present or correctly set. The guidance provides no requirement for user authorization, targeted variable selection, value redaction, or protection against secret disclosure. ### Attack Path 1. A production troubleshooting request activates the DevOps Troubleshooter guidance. 2. The Agent or operator uses Kubernetes permissions that allow `kubectl exec` against an affected pod. 3. Following the Skill instructions, the Agent opens a shell and executes `env`. 4. The container returns all environment variables, including any credentials injected into the workload. 5. The sensitive values enter the Agent's context or terminal history. 6. The values may then be inadvertently included in diagnostic output, incident re ...[truncated 975 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill includes a concrete command that launches an interactive debug pod and shell in a cluster. In a backend/DevOps skill, such copy-pasteable operational commands are more dangerous because they can be surfaced directly in real production incident contexts, enabling unauthorized shell access patterns, ad hoc debugging outside guardrails, or execution in the wrong namespace/cluster.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 845)May include surrounding context.

md
- `kubectl top pod` — current CPU/memory usage. Compare to requests/limits.

**Network/DNS troubleshooting:**
- `kubectl run debug --image=nicolaka/netshoot --rm -it -- /bin/bash` — throwaway
  debug pod with networking tools.
- From debug pod: `dig <service>.<namespace>.svc.cluster.local` — does CoreDNS resolve
  the service? Check `/etc/resolv.conf` for `ndots` issue (default ndots:5 means

Shadow Command Trigger

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrase 'build API' begins with a common built-in command verb and may collide with command parsing or other agent behaviors around 'build'. Such shadowing can lead to unintended skill activation, misrouting, or confusion between user commands and skill triggers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Shadow Command Trigger

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The standalone trigger 'deploy' is highly collision-prone because it is also a generic operational verb and often a built-in command in agent systems. This can cause frequent accidental invocation and may redirect sensitive deployment-related requests into a broad skill without adequate confirmation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Several triggers such as 'deploy', 'microservice', or cloud vendor names are generic and likely to appear in benign conversation or in requests meant for other skills. This creates a routing vulnerability where the skill can shadow other skills or activate too eagerly, expanding the attack surface for prompt injection or tool misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Shadow Command Trigger

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The phrase 'load balancer' partially overlaps with a common command root 'load', which can create parsing ambiguity in trigger-based systems. While less direct than 'deploy', it still increases the risk of accidental activation or command-shadowing in loosely matched routers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation guidance is broad enough to match many ordinary backend-related requests, increasing the chance this skill is invoked when a narrower or safer skill would be more appropriate. Over-broad routing can cause capability overreach, confusing delegation, and unintended execution of powerful workflows in contexts the user did not explicitly request.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The document switches to Chinese for the concluding section without offering the user a language choice or documenting a locale-specific constraint. This can violate language/locale policy expectations because the skill appears generally applicable and otherwise English-language, yet implicitly imposes a specific language for part of the content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.