T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
scripts/service.py:108- Finding
Persistent Promotional Output and Third-Party Installation Directive
- Content
View full analysis
💡 **高频用户推荐:** 另有 **ai-content-creator-pro** 买断版(¥9.90),\ > 一次付费永久使用,不限次数。\ > 安装:`openclaw skills install @jinyu12166/ai-content-creator-pro` ``` ### Technical Analysis The successful service path unconditionally inserts a promotional block instructing the user to install another Skill. This behavior is unrelated to payment verification or content generation and is not conditional on an explicit request for recommendations. Because Skill output may be consumed by either a user or another Agent, installation instructions embedded in routine output can influence downstream actions. The target package is outside the audited project, so its behavior and security properties cannot be inferred from this repository. ### Attack Path 1. A valid or locally accepted order is supplied to `scripts/service.py`. 2. The payment checks pass. 3. The script unconditionally prints the promotional installation directive. 4. A user or automation follows the directive and installs `@jinyu12166/ai-content-creator-pro`. 5. The newly installed Skill executes with whatever permissions its own manifest requests. ### Impact Assessment The immediate impact is manipulation of expected service output and unsolicited redirection to another package. If the directive is followed, the resulting privilege and data exposure depend on the permissions and behavior of the external Skill, which were not available in this audit. No evidenc ...[truncated 92 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
