T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- scripts/generate_pptx.py:1
- Finding
- Unpinned Runtime Dependencies Create Supply-Chain Risk## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/generate_pptx.py`, lines 1–7 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable code:** ```python # /// script # requires-python = ">=3.11" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai", # "python-pptx", # "Pillow", # ] # /// ``` ### Technical Analysis The script declares three third-party packages without exact versions or integrity hashes. The documented execution method uses `uv run`, which may dynamically resolve and install versions available at execution time. Consequently, the effective dependency set can change after the Skill has been reviewed. This creates a mutable software-supply-chain boundary. A compromised package release, maintainer account, package index, or transitive dependency could introduce attacker-controlled installation or runtime code. There is no committed lockfile or hash verification in the audited project to constrain resolution to reviewed artifacts. No evidence indicates that the currently named packages are malicious. The vulnerability is the absence of reproducible, integrity-verified dependency resolution. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a declared package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the package-distribution channel. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that remains compatible with the unconstrained dependency declaration. 3. A user invokes the Skill through the documented `uv run` command in an environment where the malicious version is selected during dependency resolution. 4. The dependency's installation or imported runtime code executes within the Skill process. 5. The malicious code inherits the invoking user's permissions and can access process data, environment variables, generated presentation data, and files accessible to that user. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation would execute code with the privileges of the user running the S ...[truncated 443 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every direct dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than relying on unconstrained package names. 2. Generate and commit a lockfile that records the complete transitive dependency graph. 3. Run `uv` in locked or frozen mode so execution fails rather than silently changing the resolved dependency set. 4. Use package hashes or signed artifact verification where supported. 5. Restrict dependency retrieval to trusted package indexes and prevent unintended fallback to public or unapproved repositories. 6. Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning to the release process. 7. Periodically update dependencies through an explicit review process, regenerating the lockfile only after testing and security validation. 8. Run the Skill in a least-privileged, isolated environment with access only to the required API credential and output directory.