T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CLI Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 10–16
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml install: - kind: uv package: deepvista-cli bins: [deepvista]Technical Analysis
The skill declares
deepvista-clias an installation dependency without specifying an exact version, cryptographic hash, lockfile, or other integrity constraint. Consequently, the package registry can resolve a different release over time, and the code ultimately installed may differ from the dependency that was originally reviewed.Package installation may execute package-controlled build or installation logic and installs an executable named
deepvista. If the publisher account, registry, distribution artifact, or a future package release is compromised, attacker-controlled code could run with the privileges of the user or environment installing the skill.The available project contains only
SKILL.md; the dependency's source and artifacts were not included and therefore could not be independently audited. There is no evidence in the reviewed file that the current package is malicious, so this finding concerns supply-chain exposure rather than a confirmed malicious payload.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry distribution path, or a future release of
deepvista-cli. - The attacker publishes a malicious version under the same package name.
- A user or automated environment installs this skill.
- Because no exact version or artifact hash is enforced,
uvresolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release. - Package installation hooks or subsequent execution of the installed
deepvistabinary runs attacker-controlled code. - The payload operates with the privileges and accessible credentials of the installing or invoking process.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution in the in ...[truncated 412 chars]
- An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry distribution path, or a future release of
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
deepvista-clito an exact, security-reviewed version rather than allowing unconstrained resolution. - Verify the package artifact using an approved lockfile and cryptographic hashes.
- Confirm and document the expected package publisher, source repository, and official distribution channel.
- Where supported, disable unnecessary package build scripts and installation hooks.
- Install the dependency in an isolated, least-privileged environment with minimal access to credentials and sensitive files.
- Establish a controlled dependency-update process that reviews source and release artifacts before changing the pinned version.
- Use automated dependency and provenance checks, including registry ownership monitoring, vulnerability scanning, and signed artifact verification where available.
- Pin
