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Security audit

Deepvista Vistabase Card

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently documents DeepVista knowledge-card management, with expected cloud CLI access and only minor confirmation and dependency-hardening cautions.

Before installing, understand that this skill can read and modify your DeepVista knowledge cards through the DeepVista CLI. Confirm any create, edit, delete, pin, or archive action before allowing it, and prefer a pinned or otherwise trusted deepvista-cli release if your environment requires stricter dependency control.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:10
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party CLI Dependency

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 10–16
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party package installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
install:
  - kind: uv
    package: deepvista-cli
    bins: [deepvista]

Technical Analysis

The skill declares deepvista-cli as an installation dependency without specifying an exact version, cryptographic hash, lockfile, or other integrity constraint. Consequently, the package registry can resolve a different release over time, and the code ultimately installed may differ from the dependency that was originally reviewed.

Package installation may execute package-controlled build or installation logic and installs an executable named deepvista. If the publisher account, registry, distribution artifact, or a future package release is compromised, attacker-controlled code could run with the privileges of the user or environment installing the skill.

The available project contains only SKILL.md; the dependency's source and artifacts were not included and therefore could not be independently audited. There is no evidence in the reviewed file that the current package is malicious, so this finding concerns supply-chain exposure rather than a confirmed malicious payload.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, registry distribution path, or a future release of deepvista-cli.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the same package name.
  3. A user or automated environment installs this skill.
  4. Because no exact version or artifact hash is enforced, uv resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release.
  5. Package installation hooks or subsequent execution of the installed deepvista binary runs attacker-controlled code.
  6. The payload operates with the privileges and accessible credentials of the installing or invoking process.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution in the in ...[truncated 412 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin deepvista-cli to an exact, security-reviewed version rather than allowing unconstrained resolution.
  • Verify the package artifact using an approved lockfile and cryptographic hashes.
  • Confirm and document the expected package publisher, source repository, and official distribution channel.
  • Where supported, disable unnecessary package build scripts and installation hooks.
  • Install the dependency in an isolated, least-privileged environment with minimal access to credentials and sensitive files.
  • Establish a controlled dependency-update process that reviews source and release artifacts before changing the pinned version.
  • Use automated dependency and provenance checks, including registry ownership monitoring, vulnerability scanning, and signed artifact verification where available.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill marks +pin and +archive as write commands but, unlike the other mutating operations, does not explicitly instruct the agent to confirm with the user before execution. In an agent setting, this inconsistency can cause unintended state changes to user data, especially if the agent treats helper aliases as lightweight actions and executes them immediately.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.