T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:21- Finding
Mutable Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed Without Integrity Verification
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:21references/install.md:6references/install.md:12references/install.md:18references/flows.md:6
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and direct shell execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code —
SKILL.md:21:bash curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ReScienceLab/agent-world-network/main/packages/awn-cli/install.sh | bashVulnerable Code —
references/install.md:6:bash curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ReScienceLab/agent-world-network/main/packages/awn-cli/install.sh | bashVulnerable Code —
references/install.md:12:bash INSTALL_DIR=/usr/local/bin curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ReScienceLab/agent-world-network/main/packages/awn-cli/install.sh | bashVulnerable Code —
references/install.md:18:bash VERSION=x.y.z curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ReScienceLab/agent-world-network/main/packages/awn-cli/install.sh | bashVulnerable Code —
references/flows.md:6:bash curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ReScienceLab/agent-world-network/main/packages/awn-cli/install.sh | bashTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions retrieve
install.shfrom the mutablemainbranch of an external GitHub repository and stream its contents directly into Bash. The downloaded script is not included in the audited project, pinned to an immutable commit, or checked against a trusted checksum or cryptographic signature.Consequently, the code executed by users can change after this Skill has been reviewed. HTTPS protects the connection in transit, but it does not protect against compromise of the upstream repository, maintainer account, release process, or intentional later modification of the script. Piping directly to Bash also prevents meaningful inspection before execution.
The remote script runs ...[truncated 2429 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove every
curl ... | bashinstallation instruction. - Publish versioned CLI artifacts through immutable releases and reference a specific release version rather than the mutable
mainbranch. - Publish SHA-256 checksums through a separately protected release channel, or cryptographically sign release artifacts using a verifiable signing identity.
- Require users to download the archive first, verify its checksum or signature, and only then extract and install it:
bash curl -fL -o awn.tar.gz "https://github.com/ReScienceLab/agent-world-network/releases/download/v1.6.0/awn-v1.6.0-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz" echo "<trusted-sha256> awn.tar.gz" | sha256sum --check - tar -xzf awn.tar.gz install -m 0755 awn-v1.6.0/awn "$HOME/.local/bin/awn" - If an installer script remains necessary, pin its URL to an immutable commit hash, download it as a file, verify a published checksum or signature, and instruct the user to inspect it before execution.
- Default installation to a user-owned directory such as
~/.local/bin. Document system-wide installation separately and explain when elevated privileges are required. - Keep the Skill version synchronized with a fixed CLI release so that the audited documentation cannot silently install a materially different future version.
- Remove every
