T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
references/codex-imagegen.md:41- Finding
Unpinned Package Download and Execution Through npx Fallback
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
references/codex-imagegen.md, line 41
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by unpinned package execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
bash If `bun` is missing, `npx -y bun <WRAPPER>/main.ts ...` works as a fallback.Technical Analysis
The documented fallback instructs the Agent to use
npx -yto download and immediately execute the package resolved under the namebun. It does not specify an exact version, integrity hash, trusted registry, lockfile, or other provenance control.The
-yoption suppresses the normal installation confirmation. Consequently, selecting this fallback can execute package code without a separate user decision. The effective code may also change after the Skill has been audited because package resolution occurs at runtime.This creates a third-party supply-chain boundary: compromise of the resolved package, its dependency graph, the configured package registry, or local package-manager configuration could result in arbitrary code execution under the Agent's operating-system identity.
Attack Path
- The runtime has no native
imagegenSkill but does have an authenticated Codex CLI. - The workflow selects the
codex-imagegenfallback. - The
baoyu-image-genroute is unavailable, and the wrapper has otherwise been located. - The trusted
bunexecutable is absent. - The Agent follows line 41 and runs
npx -y bun <WRAPPER>/main.ts .... npxresolves and downloads package content from its configured registry without an explicit confirmation.- An attacker who has compromised the package, a transitive dependency, registry resolution, or package-manager configuration supplies malicious code.
- The downloaded code executes with the same permissions and environment access as the Agent.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation provides arbitrary local code execution with the Agent process's privileges. The malicious package could r ...[truncated 349 chars]
- The runtime has no native
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the automatic
npx -y bunfallback and require a preinstalled, trusted Bun executable. - If runtime installation is unavoidable, pin an exact audited package version rather than resolving the latest available release.
- Enforce integrity verification using an approved lockfile, package hash, signed artifact, or equivalent provenance control.
- Use an explicitly configured trusted registry and reject unexpected package sources or redirects.
- Do not suppress installation confirmation. Obtain informed user approval before downloading or executing a new dependency.
- Run the dependency in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem, credential, environment-variable, and network access.
- Record the resolved package version and integrity metadata in logs so executions can be reproduced and investigated.
- Prefer a bundled, reviewed runtime or a native image-generation tool that does not require runtime package installation.
- Remove the automatic
