Apidot Veo 3 1 Api

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 9:31 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.4

Overview

This skill is a disclosed APIDot API helper that only sends reviewed video-generation requests when explicitly run.

Install this only if you intend to use APIDot for Veo 3.1 workflows. Review payloads before running the helper, keep APIDOT_API_KEY in a server-side environment, and remember that prompts, media URLs, callback URLs, and task details submitted through the script are shared with APIDot.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (4)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 78% confidence

Finding

The skill references and documents an optional shell script (scripts/submit_veo_3_1.sh) and states it can be run with curl, but the manifest does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates a trust and review gap: consumers may not be able to tell from the top-level metadata that shell execution is part of the skill’s capabilities, which can lead to unintended execution in environments that rely on manifest-declared restrictions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_veo_3_1.sh (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

sh

#!/bin/sh
set -eu

api_url="https://api.apidot.ai/api/generate/submit"
payload_file="${1:-}"
body_file=""
tmp_body_file=""

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_veo_3_1.sh (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

sh

fi
  tmp_body_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/apidot-veo-3-1-payload.XXXXXX")
  body_file="$tmp_body_file"
  chmod 600 "$body_file"
  cat > "$body_file"
fi

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_veo_3_1.sh (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

sh

{
  printf 'header = "Content-Type: application/json"\n'
  printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$APIDOT_API_KEY"
} | curl -sS "$api_url" --config - --data-binary "@$body_file"

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.