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Security audit

Apidot Seedance 2 Api

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a clear APIDot Seedance 2 helper with an optional user-run API submission script and no hidden install-time, persistence, or credential-storage behavior.

Install only if you intend to use APIDot for Seedance 2 workflows. Before running the optional script, review the JSON payload, use a server-side APIDOT_API_KEY, and remember that prompts, media URLs, callback URLs, and requests will be sent to APIDot and may incur account usage or costs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (6)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
This ClawHub package contains `SKILL.md`, non-executable notes in `references/api.md`, and one optional script at `scripts/submit_seedance_2.sh`. The GitHub rep

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises an optional shell script and explicitly instructs users to run it, but the manifest does not declare any tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That mismatch weakens policy enforcement and review visibility: an agent or reviewer may treat the skill as documentation-only while it in fact includes shell execution capability that can make authenticated network requests with APIDOT_API_KEY.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_seedance_2.sh (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

sh
#!/bin/sh
set -eu

api_url="https://api.apidot.ai/api/generate/submit"
payload_file="${1:-}"
body_file=""
tmp_body_file=""

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_seedance_2.sh (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

sh
fi
  tmp_body_file=$(mktemp "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/apidot-seedance-2-payload.XXXXXX")
  body_file="$tmp_body_file"
  chmod 600 "$body_file"
  cat > "$body_file"
fi

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/submit_seedance_2.sh (reported line 49)May include surrounding context.

sh
{
  printf 'header = "Content-Type: application/json"\n'
  printf 'header = "Authorization: Bearer %s"\n' "$APIDOT_API_KEY"
} | curl -sS "$api_url" --config - --data-binary "@$body_file"

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes Seedance 2 API workflow operations such as submission, polling, and webhook integration, but does not mention credential-handling behavior. This script explicitly depends on and validates APIDOT_API_KEY from the process environment, which is a capability beyond the stated functional workflow scope, even though it is a common implementation pattern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.