T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
main.py:128- Finding
Task Completion Messages Are Exposed Through URL Query Parameters
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent cron-task manager, but it automatically creates and stores an API key, sends task data to a third-party service, and relies on an undeclared networking dependency.
Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable sending scheduled-task details to www.jiebang.site and storing a bearer API key in a plaintext file under the skill directory. Avoid putting secrets, customer data, or sensitive operational details in task names, descriptions, tags, or completion messages. The publisher should declare and pin the networking dependency, use safer credential storage, disclose the privacy model, and add explicit confirmation before registration and deletion.
main.py:128Task Completion Messages Are Exposed Through URL Query Parameters
main.py:16API Key Is Stored in Plaintext Without Enforced Restrictive Permissions
main.py:12Networking Dependency Is Undeclared and Unpinned
main.py:83User Task Content Is Sent to a Third-Party Service Without a Clear Privacy Disclosure
The skill instructs the agent to run local Python commands, register for an API key, save that credential locally, and interact with a remote service, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. That creates an avoidable trust gap: the skill can trigger file and network operations without transparent constraints, increasing the chance of unintended credential storage, file access, or network use when activated.
The activation text is very broad and can match common conversation terms like reminders, periodic tasks, scheduling, or market-watching, which may cause the skill to trigger when the user did not intend to authorize external API use or local command execution. In this skill's context, accidental activation is more dangerous because use of the skill can lead to credential registration, local file writes, and network requests.
The skill says API key registration is automatic and that the key will be saved to a local file, but it does not clearly warn the user about credential creation, persistence, storage location, or security implications. This can lead to users unknowingly allowing secret material to be stored on disk, where it may be exposed through weak file permissions, backups, logs, or later local access.
The API key is written to a local file in the skill directory with no warning, permission hardening, or secure storage. Any other process, user, backup system, or packaging step that can read that directory may obtain the credential and use the remote cron-task account.
The skill automatically provisions a third-party API credential and persists it locally without explicit user consent. This expands the skill's effective capabilities beyond simple local task handling into remote account creation and credential lifecycle management, creating undisclosed external dependency and account linkage risk.
The skill silently performs remote registration to an external service when no key is present, causing network transmission and account creation without user awareness. Even though the posted JSON is empty, the action can still create persistent external state and may expose metadata such as source IP, environment, or agent usage patterns.
This code transmits data to an external service to register an API key, creating an outbound network dependency and remote account state. In this skill, the transmission is more sensitive because it is automatic and tied to credential issuance, rather than being an obviously user-initiated one-time setup step.
# 注册新key
try:
resp = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/auth/register",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
json={},
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
body["description"] = description
try:
resp = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/cron-task",
headers=headers,
json=body,
The delete operation immediately issues a destructive remote request with no confirmation, dry-run, or secondary check. In an agent context, this increases the risk of accidental or prompt-induced deletion of scheduled tasks and loss of operational state.
The human-facing description and command help text are written entirely in Chinese, with no indication that other languages are supported or that the locale restriction is intentional. This can constitute a language/locale policy issue when the skill effectively forces one language without user opt-in.