Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill aligns media files by reading user-provided recordings and writing sync metadata sidecars, with no evidence of credential access, network use, persistence, destructive behavior, or hidden exfiltration.
Install only if you are comfortable letting the skill read the media files you choose, run local ffmpeg/ffprobe on them, and create or update .sync.json files beside those recordings. The documentation has one stale contradictory line about _synced.MOV output, but the inspected scripts do not generate re-encoded video files.
The documentation promises sidecar-only behavior but explicitly admits the current implementation still emits _synced.MOV files. That mismatch is dangerous because users and orchestrators may approve the skill under a non-destructive mental model while it actually performs large write operations and re-encoding, creating integrity, storage, and privacy exposure on local media.
The skill describes behaviors that imply file read, file write, and shell execution, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an agent environment, that increases the chance the skill can be invoked with broader-than-necessary capabilities, enabling unintended filesystem access or command execution beyond the user's expectation.
The file repeatedly states that originals are never modified or re-encoded, yet elsewhere says the script still produces synced media files. Contradictory operational claims are a security-relevant issue because they undermine informed consent and can cause downstream automation to trust the skill with assumptions about non-destructive behavior that are false.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
"-map", "0:a:0", "-ac", "1", "-ar", str(SR),
"-f", "s16le", str(dst),
]
subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
def envelope(x: np.ndarray, sr: int = SR, hop_ms: int = 10, win_ms: int = ENV_WIN_MS):
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
"-map", "0:a:0", "-ac", "1", "-ar", str(SR),
"-f", "s16le", str(dst),
]
subprocess.run(cmd, check=True, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
def envelope(x: np.ndarray, sr: int = SR, hop_ms: int = 10, win_ms: int = ENV_WIN_MS):
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def media_duration(path: Path) -> float:
out = subprocess.run(
["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-show_entries", "format=duration",
"-of", "default=nw=1:nk=1", str(path)],
check=True, capture_output=True, text=True,
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def extract(video, dst):
subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-nostdin", "-y", "-i", str(video),
"-map", "0:a:0", "-ac", "1", "-ar", str(SR),
"-f", "s16le", str(dst)], check=True, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def media_dur(p):
out = subprocess.run(["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-show_entries", "format=duration",
"-of", "default=nw=1:nk=1", str(p)], check=True,
capture_output=True, text=True)
return float(out.stdout.strip())
The skill emphasizes that originals are untouched, but it does not clearly foreground that .sync.json files are written beside every input and later updated during verification. In security terms this is a transparency and surprise-write issue: users may run the skill in sensitive directories without realizing metadata files will be created or modified there.