T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
scripts/deploy_project.sh:4- Finding
Mutable Remote Repository Is Retrieved and Executed Without Verification
- Content
View full analysis
/tmp/openclaw-agent-control-backend.log 2>&1 & ``` ### Technical Analysis The deployment script clones or updates the mutable `main` branch of a remote Git repository and immediately starts a Python application from that checkout. It does not pin an audited commit, validate a cryptographic checksum, verify a signed commit or tag, or inspect the retrieved files before importing the remote `app` module. The `REPO_URL` environment variable also allows the caller or execution environment to substitute an arbitrary repository. When Uvicorn loads `app:app`, Python executes module-level code in the remotely retrieved `app` module. Consequently, the effective executable payload can change after this skill package has been reviewed. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the configured upstream repository or gains the ability to influence `REPO_URL`. 2. The attacker places malicious module-level Python code in the remote application's `app` module or one of its imports. 3. An operator e ...[truncated 1002 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
