TypeScript Package Manager

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: May 29, 2026 · 8:18 PM UTC
• Version: 1.0.2

Overview

This is a package-management guidance skill with risky commands to review, but the artifacts disclose those risks and do not show hidden execution or malicious behavior.

Use this skill as package-manager advice. Before running anything it suggests, inspect any .js.txt helper before renaming it, avoid blindly executing curl-or-PowerShell installer one-liners, confirm the working directory before deletion or clean commands, and review package.json and lockfile diffs before approving changes.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands

Findings (14)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: The embedded `health-check.sh` is presented as a diagnostic script, but it performs network-dependent package-manager operations such as `npm audit`, `npm outdated`, and on-demand `npx --yes ...` tool execution, which may fetch and execute remote packages. In this skill context, dependency, installer, and helper-script actions are supposed to require explicit user approval and diff review before execution, so bundling these operations into a one-shot health check increases the chance an agent runs mutating or externally sourced commands without the required guardrails.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: The markdown includes direct install commands such as bulk `npm install --save-dev ...` recommendations without mentioning the skill’s required approval and diff review controls. In an agent skill, operational examples often become executable guidance, so omission of those guardrails can lead to unreviewed dependency changes and supply-chain exposure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The script presents a migration command that pipes a remote installer directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash`, and PowerShell `iex`) without any integrity verification, pinning, or safety warning. Even though it only prints guidance rather than executing it itself, embedding this pattern in a developer helper materially increases the chance users will run a high-risk installation flow that could execute compromised or tampered code.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The guide instructs users to pipe a remotely fetched installer directly into a shell (`curl ... | bash` and PowerShell `... | iex`) without any integrity verification, pinning, or warning. This creates a real supply-chain execution risk because any compromise of the host, CDN, DNS, TLS termination, or installer script would immediately result in arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Confidence: 83% confidence
• Finding: The document states that Bun automatically loads `.env` files but does not warn that secrets in those files will be consumed by any executed app or script. In a package-management/runtime workflow, this matters because developers may run untrusted code, tests, or helper scripts that can read and exfiltrate environment-based secrets.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The document advertises `bash health-check.sh --fix` as an auto-fix mode even though the script can invoke `knip --fix`, which may modify source files or exports. Without an explicit warning about file changes and required review, an agent could treat this as a safe health check and alter the project unexpectedly.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The workflow explicitly instructs users to execute remotely fetched installer scripts via PowerShell (`iex`) and shell piping (`| sh -`) without any warning, checksum verification, signature validation, or review step. This is dangerous because compromise of the upstream host, network path, or installer content would result in immediate arbitrary code execution on the user's machine.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain

Content

{
      step: 1,
      title: 'Install Bun',
      cmd: 'curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash   # macOS/Linux\n  powershell -c "irm bun.sh/install.ps1 | iex"  # Windows',
    },
    {
      step: 2,

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The migration steps explicitly recommend fetching and immediately executing a remote script via shell on both Unix and Windows. In a package-management skill, this is more dangerous because users are likely to trust and copy these commands during setup, creating a realistic path to arbitrary code execution if the remote source, transport, or installation endpoint is compromised.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain

Content

} else {
    console.log(`\n  ${c.yellow('⚠️')}  Bun is not installed or not on PATH.`);
    console.log(`\n  Install with:`);
    console.log(`    ${c.cyan('curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash')}   # macOS/Linux`);
    console.log(`    ${c.cyan('powershell -c "irm bun.sh/install.ps1 | iex"')}  # Windows`);
  }
  console.log();

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: When Bun is not found, the helper prints a pipe-to-shell install command as the default remediation. This normalizes an unsafe installation pattern at the point of user action, increasing the likelihood of arbitrary code execution from an unreviewed remote script.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain

Content

### macOS / Linux

```bash
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
```

### Windows (via PowerShell)

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: This is explicit external script fetching followed by immediate execution: `curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash`. It is dangerous because it turns a documentation snippet into a one-step arbitrary code execution path with no review or verification, which is especially risky in a skill about package managers and developer tooling where users are expected to run shell commands.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain

Content

```bash
# Install Bun
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash

# Remove node_modules and reinstall with Bun
rm -rf node_modules

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The migration section repeats the same unsafe pattern, again normalizing direct execution of a remote installer script. Repetition increases the chance users will copy and run it, reinforcing insecure operational behavior in a high-trust developer context.

External Script Fetching

High

• Category: Supply Chain

Content

iwr https://get.pnpm.io/install.ps1 -useb | iex

# Using standalone script (macOS/Linux)
curl -fsSL https://get.pnpm.io/install.sh | sh -
```

### Verify Installation

• Confidence: 99% confidence
• Finding: The command `curl -fsSL https://get.pnpm.io/install.sh | sh -` fetches code from the internet and executes it immediately, creating a direct arbitrary-code-execution path. In a package-management skill, users are especially likely to copy-paste install commands, which makes this context more dangerous because it normalizes unsafe bootstrap practices in developer environments that often have broad filesystem and credential access.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

### macOS / Linux

```bash
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash
```

### Windows (via PowerShell)

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The `| bash` chaining is the precise dangerous element that converts network content into immediate shell execution. In documentation for a package-management skill, this is materially risky because users are likely to execute commands verbatim, making any upstream compromise or content tampering directly exploitable.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

```bash
# Install Bun
curl -fsSL https://bun.sh/install | bash

# Remove node_modules and reinstall with Bun
rm -rf node_modules

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: This repeated `| bash` chain in the migration steps perpetuates an unsafe copy-paste install pattern. The skill context makes it more dangerous because migration/setup guides are high-likelihood execution paths during initial project bootstrapping, when users are least likely to scrutinize commands.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.