T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
references/add-css-style.md:319- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party CSS Framework Resources Without Subresource Integrity
- Content
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``` ```html ``` ```html ``` ### Technical Analysis These examples load executable JavaScript and stylesheets directly from third-party CDNs. The resources do not use Subresource Integrity hashes, and the Tailwind URL is not pinned to an immutable version. Consequently, the effective content can change after the Skill has been reviewed. Although the Skill separately recommends SRI as a best practice, its directly reusable framework examples do not consistently implement that recommendation. If an upstream package, CDN, publishing account, or mutable resource is compromised, generated pages that copy these examples will execute or apply attacker-controlled content. The Skill only needs to provide HTML development guidance. Automatic reliance on mutable third-party executable resources is not necessary for that functionality and exceeds the minimum-risk approach. ### Attack Path 1. A user requests a page using Bootstrap or Tailwind CSS. 2. The Agent copies one of the documented CDN integration examples. 3. The generated page loads the dependency when opened in a browser. 4. An attacker compromises the CDN, package publisher, or mutable resource. 5. The browser retrieves the modified resource because no integrity hash constrains its content. 6. Malicious JavaScript executes in the page origin and can access data and browser capabilities available to that page. ### Impact Assessment A compromised JavaScript dependency could execute arbitrary code in the browser context of every visitor to the aff ...[truncated 471 chars]- Remediation
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