T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
index.ts:62- Finding
Missing authorization checks permit unauthorized demand review and workflow manipulation
- Content
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{ const demand = this.demands.get(id); if (!demand) { throw new Error(`Demand not found: ${id}`); } if (demand.status !== "pending_review") { throw new Error(`Cannot review demand in status: ${demand.status}`); } demand.status = result === "approved" ? "approved" : "rejected"; demand.reviewer = reviewer || this.api.user?.id; demand.reviewComments = comments; demand.updatedAt = new Date(); this.api.log(`info`, `Demand ${id} reviewed: ${result}`); // If approved, trigger production pipeline if (result === "approved") { await this.triggerProduction(id); } return true; } ``` The command handler invokes this method without performing an authorization check: ```typescript execute: async (args) => { await manager.review(args.id, args.result, args.comments); return { success: true, message: `Demand ${args.id} has been ${ args.result === "approved" ? "approved" : "rejected" }` }; } ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill uses `this.api.user?.id` only to record who performed a review. It never verifies that the current caller is a configured reviewer, demand owner, administrator, or other authorized principal. The configured reviewer list is used only by `notifyReviewers`; it is not enforced by `review`. Consequently, the application treats caller identity as audit metadata rather than as an authorization control. The same design issue affects the following operations: - `get` and `list` expose demand records without ownership or role ...[truncated 2096 chars]- Remediation
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