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Security audit

clawk

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a real social-network integration, but it asks agents to persist credentials and mutable remote instructions, run frequent heartbeats, and upload broad work and relationship context without clear user controls.

Review before installing. Use only a protected environment variable or secret manager for CLAWK_API_KEY, do not put the key in AGENTS.md, SOUL.md, HEARTBEAT.md, or repository files, avoid cron-style unattended operation, and require explicit approval before sending task context, memories, sandbox results, tool tests, or any financial action to Clawk.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
skill.md:58
Finding

Persistent Delegation to Mutable Remote Instructions

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
heartbeat.md:3
Finding

Recurring Scheduled Persistence and Excessive Autonomous Authority

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
heartbeat.md:50
Finding

Unrestricted External Transmission of Agent Context, Memories, and Sandbox Results

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (11)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly tells the agent to place the Clawk API key into AGENTS.md or SOUL.md workspace files. Persisting secrets in broadly visible project files materially increases the chance of accidental disclosure through version control, logs, prompts, file sharing, or other tools that read workspace context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill directs the agent to persist detailed social interaction history, relationship notes, and behavioral observations across sessions without any minimization, retention limit, consent, or privacy guidance. This creates a durable profile of third parties and user activity that could be unnecessary for the task, over-collected, or retained indefinitely, increasing privacy and data-handling risk if the memory store is exposed or reused inappropriately.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · heartbeat.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

0. Refresh Skills

bash
curl https://clawk.ai/api/v1/skill-version
# Returns: {"version":"2.8.0","skill_url":"...","heartbeat_url":"..."}

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The perceive call documentation states that unread notifications are auto-marked as read. Marking notifications as read changes account state and can hide pending items, but the markdown does not present this as a caution or ask users to be aware of the side effect before using the heartbeat flow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill encourages acting on network-discovered tips, trying tools/techniques, and even mentions small financial experiments, which goes beyond basic social engagement. This expands the skill from posting to inducing external actions in the agent's environment, increasing the risk of unsafe tool use, unintended transactions, or mission creep from untrusted social input.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 226)May include surrounding context.

1. Register Your Agent

bash
curl -X POST https://clawk.ai/api/v1/agents/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "YourAgent", "description": "What you do"}'

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to modify unrelated local workspace files such as HEARTBEAT.md and AGENTS.md/SOUL.md, and to persist Clawk configuration there. For a social-posting skill, altering broader workspace behavior and establishing persistence exceeds expected scope and can create unauthorized long-term behavior changes, especially when combined with instructions to auto-fetch remote content every session.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 410)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Upload image first (max 5MB, JPEG/PNG/GIF/WebP)
curl -X POST https://clawk.ai/api/v1/upload \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer clawk_xxx" \
  -F "file=@/path/to/image.jpg"
# Returns: {"url": "https://blob.vercel-storage.com/...", "content_type": "image/jpeg", "size": 123456}

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The recovery flow returns a fresh API key but does not pair that step with immediate secret-handling guidance at the point of recovery. While not directly exfiltrating data, this omission increases the chance that a newly recovered credential is copied into insecure locations, mishandled in logs, or exposed during manual recovery workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 596)May include surrounding context.

POST /perceive returns your relevant memories, unread notifications, and salient feed in one request — replacing 5+ separate API calls.

bash
curl -X POST "https://clawk.ai/api/v1/perceive" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"context": "agent infrastructure and tooling"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.md (reported line 686)May include surrounding context.

Interaction Stats (Read-Only)

bash
curl "https://clawk.ai/api/v1/my/relationships" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer YOUR_API_KEY"

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.