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Security audit

飞书语音回复

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it says at a high level, but it can turn chat text into audio through an external TTS tool and send Feishu messages under broad triggers without enough user-control or privacy guidance.

Review before installing. This skill is intended for Feishu voice replies, but users should avoid using it for secrets, private records, or sensitive business content unless they are comfortable sending that text to the TTS provider and into Feishu. It should be tightened to require explicit Feishu voice-message intent, document the external TTS data flow, and remove the unresolved conflict markers.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (7)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The implemented code matches part of the description: it turns text into speech and converts the result into an Ogg/Opus file suitable for later use. However, the declared purpose goes further and claims the skill sends the result as a Feishu-native voice message so it appears as tappable in Feishu alongside visible text. No Feishu API calls, upload steps, message-send logic, authentication, or text-message composition are present. The code only performs local file generation and prints metadata. Therefore the description materially overstates the actual behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs use of a shell-invoked Python script and ffmpeg, but it declares no tool scope or permissions boundary. That creates a capability gap where an agent may execute shell commands without an explicit allowlist, increasing the risk of unintended command execution or unsafe expansion of the skill's operational surface.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The invocation text includes broad triggers like voice playback or spoken summaries, which can cause the skill to activate in situations the user did not specifically intend. Over-broad activation matters here because the skill can invoke synthesis, shell-based media conversion, and outbound Feishu message behavior, expanding the chance of unnecessary processing or data being sent in audio form.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The markdown sets 'Default language: Chinese' and a Chinese TTS voice, but does not state that the user can choose another language or that Chinese is only used when explicitly requested. This creates a language-policy concern because the skill appears to force a locale choice by default.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/build_feishu_voice.py (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

python
def run(cmd):
    proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
    if proc.returncode != 0:
        raise RuntimeError(proc.stderr.strip() or proc.stdout.strip() or f"command failed: {' '.join(cmd)}")
    return proc

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The script sends provided text to edge-tts, which may involve transmission to an external TTS service, but it gives no disclosure, consent prompt, or guardrail about sending potentially sensitive content off-host. In a messaging skill that may synthesize arbitrary user or conversation text, this creates a real privacy and data-handling risk if secrets, personal data, or internal information are spoken via a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The merge-conflict markers indicate the skill documentation is in an inconsistent state, leaving contradictory operational instructions in place. In agent skills, ambiguous instructions can cause unpredictable execution paths or reviewer confusion, which can mask unsafe behavior and weaken assurance around how user content is transformed before processing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.