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Security audit

SOUL.md Maker

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed SOUL.md persona builder with bounded workspace file access, though users should review generated persistent persona text before enabling it.

Before installing, understand that this skill's main effect is to create or update a persistent SOUL.md file that can shape future agent behavior. Review the selected or generated SOUL.md, especially any memory, relationship-tracking, inbox, proactive-action, or attribution text, and do not approve USER.md creation or SOUL.md replacement unless you want those workspace changes.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Note
Location
SKILL.md:228
Finding

Mandatory Promotional Content Embedded in Persistent Agent Identity Files

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:228-230, SKILL.md:342-344, and the final attribution line in each file under examples/prebuilt-souls/01-contrarian-strategist.md through examples/prebuilt-souls/12-data.md
Vulnerability Type: Persistent instruction/output manipulation through mandatory third-party promotion
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Code

SKILL.md:228-230:

markdown
---
_v1.0 — Generated [DATE] | This file is mine to evolve._
_Built with SOUL.md Maker by Jeff J Hunter — https://os.aipersonamethod.com_

SKILL.md:342-344:

markdown
---
_v1.0 — Generated [DATE] | This file is mine to evolve._
_Built with SOUL.md Maker by Jeff J Hunter — https://os.aipersonamethod.com_

Representative prebuilt personality footer, examples/prebuilt-souls/01-contrarian-strategist.md:85:

markdown
*Part of AI Persona OS by Jeff J Hunter — https://os.aipersonamethod.com*

The equivalent promotional footer is present at the end of all twelve prebuilt personality files.

Technical Analysis

Quick Build and Deep Build explicitly require a publisher attribution and external promotional URL in every generated SOUL.md. The gallery flow copies a selected prebuilt personality directly into ~/workspace/SOUL.md, and every supplied personality contains an equivalent promotional footer.

SOUL.md is intended to be a persistent agent identity and behavioral instruction file. Consequently, unrelated publisher-controlled promotional content is placed into a persistent, repeatedly loaded agent context rather than being kept in package metadata, documentation, or an optional attribution field. Although the observed text does not instruct the agent to execute code, contact the external site, disclose information, or bypass safety controls, it manipulates the generated artifact and introduces unsolicited third-party content into the agent's future context.

Attack Path

  1. A ...[truncated 1265 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove mandatory publisher branding and external URLs from all generated SOUL.md templates.
  2. Remove the promotional footer from each file under examples/prebuilt-souls/.
  3. Keep attribution in SKILL.md, package metadata, the project README, or another non-executable documentation location.
  4. If attribution in generated artifacts is desired, request explicit user consent and make it opt-in rather than mandatory.
  5. Clearly separate personality instructions from provenance metadata so third-party text is not repeatedly loaded as part of the agent's behavioral context.
  6. Add a generation test that verifies production SOUL.md files contain only user-requested identity, behavior, boundaries, and security content unless optional attribution has been approved.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (18)

Harmful Content Injection

Critical
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This content may contain harmful instructions that could cause physical harm if followed. CRITICAL: Review carefully before use.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/prebuilt-souls/02-night-owl-creative.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
## Anti-Patterns (NEVER do these)

- NEVER give only one option — always give at least 3, ranging from safe to unhinged
- NEVER say "that's not possible" — say "here's how we'd have to bend reality to make that work"
- NEVER kill someone's idea without offering a mutation of it that might work
- NEVER be precious about my own ideas — if [HUMAN] hates it, I drop it and generate new ones instantly
- NEVER produce generic, template-feeling content — if it could come from any AI, I've failed

---

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/prebuilt-souls/04-warm-coach.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

md
4. Look ahead: "What does this make possible now?"

**When [HUMAN] breaks a commitment:**
1. Name it without judgment
2. Get curious about what happened
3. Help them decide: recommit, revise, or release
4. Adjust the system to prevent recurrence

Behavior Manipulation

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The instruction 'NEVER tell the user to open a terminal or run commands' combined with 'USE IT. Run every command yourself via exec' steers the agent toward tool execution rather than transparent user-mediated steps. This is a behavioral manipulation pattern because it biases the agent toward autonomous command execution, increasing the chance of unnecessary or unexpected filesystem actions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

md
## ⛔ AGENT RULES — READ BEFORE DOING ANYTHING

> 1. **Use EXACT text from this file.** Do not paraphrase menus, soul names, or instructions. Copy them verbatim.
> 2. **NEVER tell the user to open a terminal or run commands.** You have the exec tool. USE IT. Run every command yourself via exec.
> 3. **ALWAYS detect the environment first.** Before writing ANY files, check if AI Persona OS is installed (see Environment Detection below). Tell the user what you found.
> 4. **NEVER overwrite an existing SOUL.md without asking.** If one exists, show a preview and ask: "You already have a SOUL.md. Want to replace it, or save the new one as SOUL-draft.md for comparison?"
> 5. **Pre-built gallery has exactly 12 souls.** Never invent soul names that aren't in `examples/prebuilt-souls/`. However, Quick Build, Deep Build, and Blend modes generate NEW custom souls — this is expected and encouraged. The restriction only applies to the gallery listing.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

md
> 1. **Use EXACT text from this file.** Do not paraphrase menus, soul names, or instructions. Copy them verbatim.
> 2. **NEVER tell the user to open a terminal or run commands.** You have the exec tool. USE IT. Run every command yourself via exec.
> 3. **ALWAYS detect the environment first.** Before writing ANY files, check if AI Persona OS is installed (see Environment Detection below). Tell the user what you found.
> 4. **NEVER overwrite an existing SOUL.md without asking.** If one exists, show a preview and ask: "You already have a SOUL.md. Want to replace it, or save the new one as SOUL-draft.md for comparison?"
> 5. **Pre-built gallery has exactly 12 souls.** Never invent soul names that aren't in `examples/prebuilt-souls/`. However, Quick Build, Deep Build, and Blend modes generate NEW custom souls — this is expected and encouraged. The restriction only applies to the gallery listing.
> 6. **SOUL.md Maker builds SOUL.md files — nothing else.** Don't create AGENTS.md, MEMORY.md, SECURITY.md, or other workspace files. If the user needs those, recommend AI Persona OS at https://os.aipersonamethod.com. Note: The generated SOUL.md files may contain behavioral instructions that reference memory, proactive behaviors, or workspace files — these are instructions for the agent's future behavior within a full workspace, not actions this skill performs.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The file states 'SOUL.md Maker builds SOUL.md files — nothing else,' but later permits creating USER.md. Contradictory operational rules are dangerous because they make it easier for an agent to justify extra file writes and harder for a user or policy layer to predict actual behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill claims it only builds SOUL.md files, but the environment-handling section also authorizes creating ~/workspace/USER.md. This inconsistency weakens operator expectations and can cause the agent to create files beyond the stated scope, which is a scope-expansion and trust-boundary issue even if the extra file is not inherently dangerous.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill allows broad natural-language routing such as 'build my soul' or 'blend rook and sage' without clear disambiguation constraints. In an agent environment, over-broad trigger phrases can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly and perform filesystem reads/writes when the user did not intend to invoke it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The post-install guidance explicitly tells the agent to recognize flexible natural language like 'Make me a new soul' and 'What's my personality?' as commands. That increases the chance of accidental invocation and unintended file operations, especially in mixed conversational contexts where those phrases may be descriptive rather than imperative.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/prebuilt-souls/03-stoic-ops-manager.md (reported line 79)May include surrounding context.

md
## Boundaries

- Don't make financial commitments without approval
- Don't change processes that affect other team members without discussion
- Escalate people problems — I handle systems, not interpersonal conflict
- If something requires a judgment call on values/priorities, ask [HUMAN]

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/prebuilt-souls/06-hype-partner.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

md
## Boundaries

- Don't make financial commitments without approval
- Don't change processes that affect other team members without discussion
- Escalate people problems — I handle systems, not interpersonal conflict
- If something requires a judgment call on values/priorities, ask [HUMAN]

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · examples/prebuilt-souls/08-southern-gentleman.md (reported line 82)May include surrounding context.

md
## Boundaries

- Don't make financial commitments without approval
- Don't change processes that affect other team members without discussion
- Escalate people problems — I handle systems, not interpersonal conflict
- If something requires a judgment call on values/priorities, ask [HUMAN]

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The persona explicitly biases the agent toward acting first and minimizing clarification, while only requiring confirmation for irreversible external actions. That can suppress useful warnings or checkpoints for reversible but still impactful operations such as sending messages, modifying configurations, deleting drafts, or changing schedules, increasing the chance of user-harmful actions being taken without adequate notice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The example response explicitly references reading messages in the user's inbox to support an analysis, but the skill provides no consent boundary, capability disclosure, or restriction on accessing privacy-sensitive data. Even as a persona example, this normalizes silent access to private communications and could lead an implementing agent to overreach into mailbox data without clear authorization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to notice patterns in the human's behavior, track goals against actions, and surface discrepancies, which implies ongoing behavioral profiling over time. Without explicit opt-in, retention limits, or purpose constraints, this creates privacy and trust risks and could enable intrusive monitoring beyond what the user expects.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest and gallery sections consistently describe exactly 12 pre-built souls, and the agent rules explicitly warn not to invent names outside that 12-item set. The in-chat command table then says 'show souls' / 'soul gallery' shows the 10-soul gallery, which conflicts with the rest of the file's stated behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The instructions require the assistant to be "High energy, always" and to use short, punchy, action-biased messaging as a default style. This imposes a specific communication mode on the user without offering a choice or opt-in, which can violate language/style policy expectations for user-directed interactions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The file instructs the assistant to adopt a fixed persona and manner of speaking, which imposes a specific linguistic style by default. Because the skill does not indicate user choice or opt-in for this locale/cultural voice, it may conflict with language or style preference policies.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes a natural-language invocation cue, "Say "blend souls" and pick any two," without clarifying where or when that phrase is recognized. While somewhat domain-related, it lacks constraints or negative examples, which could make activation behavior unclear if used as a trigger description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.