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Security audit

Geo Brand Master

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a real brand visibility monitoring skill, but it needs review because it sends business queries to external services and ships unsafe API and licensing controls.

Install only if you are comfortable sending brand names, competitor terms, result snippets, and reports to external AI/search services and to Feishu when configured. Do not expose the bundled Flask API publicly unless the hardcoded key, input validation, rate limits, and network binding are fixed. Review the local quota/report files and pin dependencies before production use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (4)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
api/geo_api.py:21
Finding

Hardcoded API Key Grants Unauthorized Pro Service Access

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
api/geo_api.py:86
Finding

Unvalidated Search Parameters Permit Upstream Resource Abuse

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/geo_report.py:139
Finding

Predictable Shared Temporary File Enables Symlink-Based File Overwrite

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
api/requirements.txt:1
Finding

Open-Ended Dependency Versions Create Non-Reproducible Supply-Chain Exposure

Content
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=2.0 requests>=2.25 gunicorn>=20.0 ``` The installation documentation also recommends an unpinned Playwright installation in `README.md`: ```bash pip install playwright && playwright install chromium ``` ### Technical Analysis Every API dependency uses only a lower version bound. A future installation can therefore select any newer package version available from the configured package index. The installed dependency graph is not reproducible and may change without source-code review. This is not evidence that Flask, Requests, Gunicorn, or Playwright are malicious. The security issue is that the project does not constrain installations to reviewed artifacts or verify package hashes. A compromised release, vulnerable future version, incompatible major release, or compromised package index could consequently introduce unreviewed code into the deployment. Python packages execute code during installation and application startup, while Playwright additionally downloads a browser binary. These components operate with the privileges of the installing or running account. ### Attack Path 1. An operator installs dependencies using the provided requirements or README command. 2. The package resolver selects the newest version satisfying each open-ended constraint. 3. A selected release or transitive dependency contains a vulnerability or has been compromised. 4. The package or installation logic executes under the operator's account. 5. The affected dependency gains access to the application's runtime environment, including environment variables, files, and network capabilities available to that account. ### Impact Assessment The exact impact depends on the behavior of a future compromised or vulnerable dependency; no currently malicious dependency was identified ...[truncated 419 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (45)

Tainted flow: 'TAVILY_API_KEY' from os.environ.get (line 15, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · api/geo_api.py (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

python
def search_brand_tavily(brand_name, max_results=5):
    """使用Tavily搜索品牌信息"""
    try:
        response = requests.post(
            TAVILY_API_URL,
            json={
                "api_key": TAVILY_API_KEY,

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The code partially overlaps with the description in that it performs brand-related searching and outputs a 0-100 score. However, the primary behavior is materially narrower and different from the declared product. It exposes a small authenticated Flask API that submits a single Tavily search query like ' 品牌 AI 服务' and assigns a score via min(len(results)*15, 100). It does not integrate with or search Kimi/Xunfei/Zhipu/Wenxin/DeepSeek/etc., does not analyze recommendation failures, does not push to Feishu, and does not implement competitor monitoring. The use of API-key authentication is a supporting implementation detail, not itself a mismatch, but the major declared capabilities are absent or substituted with a generic web-search backend.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents a broader end-to-end monitoring tool with platform searching, visibility detection, scoring, analysis, and notification support. The supplied code implements only a narrower analysis module that consumes already-provided search results and an already-provided GEM score. While the 'analyze why brand was not recommended' portion aligns with the description, the primary behavior of this specific code chunk does not include the other major declared capabilities. There is also an undeclared optional external network call to an AI endpoint via curl, but it is directly in service of the analysis function rather than an unrelated capability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The declared description presents an end-user monitoring product focused on searching AI platforms, evaluating brand visibility, generating scores, and producing analysis/pushes. The supplied code does not perform any of those monitoring or analysis functions. Instead, it handles monetization and access control: validating API keys with a remote service, limiting free-tier brands/platforms, persisting monthly quota state locally, and exposing upgrade/downgrade helpers. While quota enforcement could be a supporting implementation detail for the broader product, this chunk also introduces undeclared external verification and licensing behavior that is materially different from the declared functionality and not represented in the description or permissions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The core purpose mostly aligns: the code does search multiple AI platforms for a brand keyword and generates a GEM-style visibility score/report. However, several declared capabilities are not implemented. There is no logic for AI-generated causal analysis of why the brand was not recommended, and no Feishu push support appears anywhere in the code. Additionally, while the interface accepts multiple keywords, the search logic uses only self.keywords[0] for querying, so multi-keyword monitoring is overstated. The code also saves reports to the local Desktop, which is an undeclared resource access, though this is secondary to the main mismatch. Therefore the description overstates the implemented functionality enough to count as a mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Lp1

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This service makes HTTP requests to an external API, but that network capability is not covered by declared permissions. In a skill context, undisclosed egress is security-relevant because user input and operational metadata may be transmitted to third parties without explicit approval.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Lp1

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This service makes HTTP requests to an external API, but that network capability is not covered by declared permissions. In a skill context, undisclosed egress is security-relevant because user input and operational metadata may be transmitted to third parties without explicit approval.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Lp1

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This skill contains shell-capable behavior by launching curl through subprocess, but the declared permissions do not cover that capability. In an agent-skill context, undeclared execution capabilities reduce transparency and can bypass operator expectations or policy controls, making the skill more dangerous than equivalent standalone code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Lp1

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The skill uses 'file_read' capability that is not listed in its permissions. This may indicate deceptive intent or missing permission declarations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Lp1

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The skill uses 'file_write' capability that is not listed in its permissions. This may indicate deceptive intent or missing permission declarations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The module includes undocumented local functions to upgrade a user to pro or enterprise by simply editing the local quota file. In a brand monitoring skill, this capability is unrelated to core business logic and effectively provides a built-in license-escalation mechanism that can be abused to unlock paid functionality without valid authorization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly advertises that Pro requests are routed through the vendor's server, but it does not clearly warn users that brand queries and related monitoring data leave the local environment and are transmitted to a third party. This creates a real privacy and confidentiality risk, especially because monitored brand terms, competitive research, and visibility results may be commercially sensitive.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The README tells users to configure a Feishu webhook for report delivery but does not warn that generated report contents will be sent to an external messaging endpoint outside the local execution context. If reports contain sensitive brand-monitoring results, prompts, or competitive intelligence, this can lead to unintended disclosure to third-party systems or overly broad internal audiences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are very broad and overlap with common user requests about GEO, AI visibility, or competitor monitoring. In agent ecosystems, overly broad triggers can cause accidental invocation, leading the skill to process sensitive brand queries or initiate external lookups in contexts where the user did not intend to use this tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises external API usage and Feishu webhook support, but it does not clearly warn that user-supplied brand names, queries, and potentially generated results may be transmitted to third-party services. This creates a privacy and data-governance risk, especially for confidential competitor analysis, unreleased brands, or internal monitoring terms.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly routes functionality through an external server and performs API-key verification against api.yk-global.com. Any time user queries, telemetry, or keys are sent to a third-party endpoint, there is a real data exposure and trust-boundary risk; in this skill context, brand-monitoring queries may be commercially sensitive and the server-mediated design increases that sensitivity.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

md
- ✅ Routed through our server — no local environment needed
- ✅ Stable and efficient, no IP blocking

> After purchasing Pro/Enterprise, get your API key at [https://yk-global.com](https://yk-global.com) and use `--api-key YOUR_KEY` to unlock all features. Verification: `POST https://api.yk-global.com/v1/verify`. On failure, auto-downgrades to Free — no disruption.

## Supported AI Platforms

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The module description and error message text are written in Chinese, and the query string is also hard-coded with Chinese terms, with no indication that users may choose another language or that the service is intentionally region-specific. This can violate language/locale policy where skills should not force a specific language without opt-in or clear justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · api/geo_api.py (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

python
TAVILY_API_KEY = os.environ.get('TAVILY_API_KEY', '')
if not TAVILY_API_KEY:
    raise ValueError("请设置 TAVILY_API_KEY 环境变量")
TAVILY_API_URL = "https://api.tavily.com/search"

# API认证(简易版:检查X-API-Key头)
API_KEYS = {

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The code sends user-provided brand queries to an external third-party endpoint. While external transmission is functionally required for this service, it is still a real security/privacy concern because business-sensitive queries leave the local trust boundary and are processed by another provider.

Content

Scanner excerpt · api/geo_api.py (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

python
def search_brand_tavily(brand_name, max_results=5):
    """使用Tavily搜索品牌信息"""
    try:
        response = requests.post(
            TAVILY_API_URL,
            json={
                "api_key": TAVILY_API_KEY,

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

User-supplied brand data is transmitted to a third-party service together with a service credential, yet the code provides no disclosure, consent, or data-handling notice. In this skill's brand-monitoring context, inputs may contain sensitive business terms or client identifiers, making silent external transmission more risky.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The docstring and printed messages are entirely in Chinese (for example at L02, L10, L16, and L21), which imposes a specific language on users. The policy for this category says to flag language or locale constraints unless the skill offers user opt-in or clearly documents a justified region-specific scope, neither of which appears here.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · api/test_api.py (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

python
def test_search(brand="91tokenhub"):
    """测试搜索"""
    resp = requests.post(
        API_URL,
        headers={"X-API-Key": TEST_KEY},
        json={"brand": brand, "max_results": 5}

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The config sets the report language to "zh-CN", which is a natural-language locale constraint. Because this file does not indicate that the user can choose another language or opt in to Chinese output, it may violate the policy against forcing a specific language without user consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/geo_analyzer.py (reported line 70)May include surrounding context.

python
# ⚠️ 如需启用AI分析功能,请在此填入您的AI接口地址
        # 例如:https://your-api-server.com/v1/chat/completions
        # 当前默认使用本地分析框架(见 _get_fallback_analysis)
        AI_ENDPOINT = ""  # <-- 填入AI接口地址,如 https://api.minimax.chat/v1/chat/completions

        if not AI_ENDPOINT:
            return self._get_fallback_analysis()

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

If AI_ENDPOINT is configured, the code sends the brand name, GEM score, and summarized search-result snippets to an external AI service without any runtime disclosure or consent gate. In this skill's monitoring context, those snippets may contain sensitive business intelligence, customer-related text, or proprietary competitive-analysis data, so silent transmission creates a real privacy and data-governance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.