T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/generate_image.py:2- Finding
Unbounded Runtime Dependency Resolution
- Content
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=3.10" # dependencies = [ # "google-genai>=1.0.0", # "pillow>=10.0.0", # ] # /// ``` `SKILL.md:10-14`: ```json "api_key_required": true, "runners": ["uv"], "dependencies": ["requests", "beautifulsoup4"], "requires": { "bins": ["uv"], "env": ["GEMINI_API_KEY"] }, "primaryEnv": "GEMINI_API_KEY", ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented execution command uses `uv run`, while the script specifies dependencies using open-ended lower bounds. No lockfile, exact version constraints, or package hashes are included in the reviewed project. Consequently, future executions can resolve and install dependency versions that were not represented in the audited artifact. The metadata also declares `requests` and `beautifulsoup4`, although the executable script actually depends on `google-genai` and `pillow`. This inconsistency can unnecessarily increase the dependency surface where the metadata declarations are honored. This does not establish that any current dependency is malicious. The weakness is that dependency behavior can change after review and package installation or import code executes with the invoking user's permissions. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the distribution account or release process for a permitted future version of a dependency. 2. A user or Agent invokes the documented `uv run` command. 3. Because dependency versions are not exactly pinned or locked, `uv` resolves the compromised version. 4. The package is installed and subsequently imported by the script. 5. Malicious package initialization code executes with the permissions and environment of the invoking process. 6. That process may access files and environment variables av ...[truncated 516 chars]- Remediation
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