T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:19- Finding
Plaintext Authentication Token Storage Without Access Controls
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 19-22
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive-data storage
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown | File | Description | |------|-------------| | `{baseDir}/.teambition` | Stores the MCP Server URL and userId | | `{baseDir}/.teambition-token` | Stores the user authentication token (optional, for operations requiring login) |Technical Analysis
The Skill prescribes storing the user's Teambition authentication token in a predictable local plaintext file,
{baseDir}/.teambition-token. It does not require restrictive file permissions, verify ownership, recommend a protected credential store, or warn against committing the file to source control.Although the repository does not contain a token or executable code that directly leaks one, this configuration practice can expose credentials to other local users or processes with access to the base directory. Backups, indexing services, diagnostic collection, or accidental repository commits may also copy the token into less protected locations.
Attack Path
- A user enables authenticated Teambition operations and stores a valid token in
{baseDir}/.teambition-tokenas instructed. - The file is created with permissions inherited from the environment and without an explicit
0600restriction. - An unauthorized local user, compromised process, backup service, or source-control workflow obtains the file.
- The attacker extracts the plaintext token.
- The attacker submits authenticated requests to the configured Teambition service.
- The attacker accesses or modifies resources allowed by the compromised user's Teambition privileges.
This attack requires an additional avenue for reading the file or obtaining a copied version; the Skill itself does not implement credential exfiltration.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation compromises the Teambition authority represented by the stolen token. Depending on ...[truncated 680 chars]
- A user enables authenticated Teambition operations and stores a valid token in
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Store authentication tokens in an operating-system credential manager, protected MCP secret facility, or dedicated secrets manager rather than in the project directory.
- If file-based storage is unavoidable, create the token file atomically with owner-only permissions:
bash umask 077 install -m 600 /dev/null "{baseDir}/.teambition-token" - Validate that the token file is a regular file owned by the current user and is not a symbolic link before reading or writing it.
- Reject files with group or world permissions and provide a safe command to correct them:
bash chmod 600 "{baseDir}/.teambition-token" - Add
.teambition-tokento.gitignoreand relevant backup, indexing, and diagnostic-collection exclusions. - Never print, log, transmit, or include the token in error messages and command histories.
- Use narrowly scoped, short-lived tokens where supported, and document token rotation and revocation procedures.
- Clearly separate non-sensitive endpoint configuration from credentials and document the security requirements for each file.
