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Security audit

Signalis

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only skill for using the Signalis API, with clearly disclosed free and paid endpoints, but users should be careful with wallet private keys and paid x402 calls.

Install only if you intend to use Signalis. Treat the paid examples as real USDC spending on Base Mainnet, use a dedicated low-balance wallet rather than a production wallet, avoid exposing PRIVATE_KEY in shared logs or agent environments, and prefer the free endpoints first to verify response shapes.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 38)May include surrounding context.

| GET | /v1/intelligence/latest | 5/min | Full Master Intelligence digest — cross-source synthesis of all feeds: narratives, signals, crossDomainInsights, and full markdown analysis (4h cadence) |

bash
curl https://api.signalis.dev/v1/intelligence/latest

Paid endpoints (x402 V2, USDC on Base only, per-call)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

| GET | /v1/intelligence/latest | 5/min | Full Master Intelligence digest — cross-source synthesis of all feeds: narratives, signals, crossDomainInsights, and full markdown analysis (4h cadence) |

bash
curl https://api.signalis.dev/v1/intelligence/latest

Paid endpoints (x402 V2, USDC on Base only, per-call)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

| GET | /v1/intelligence/latest | 5/min | Full Master Intelligence digest — cross-source synthesis of all feeds: narratives, signals, crossDomainInsights, and full markdown analysis (4h cadence) |

bash
curl https://api.signalis.dev/v1/intelligence/latest

Paid endpoints (x402 V2, USDC on Base only, per-call)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The example code reads a blockchain private key directly from an environment variable and immediately uses it to authorize payments. While common in developer samples, this normalizes unsafe key handling and may lead users to run the skill with a hot wallet key in an agent environment, where logs, subprocesses, plugins, or misconfiguration could expose the secret and enable unauthorized on-chain payments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

This code sends a payment-enabled request to an external service using a wallet client backed by a private key, which can trigger real on-chain authorization and spending. In the context of an agent skill, combining outbound network calls with automatic payment retry raises the risk of unintended financial transactions if the example is copied into autonomous workflows without spending limits or human approval.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md
// $0.01 — active AI-business narratives:
const narratives = await fetchWithPay(
  "https://api.signalis.dev/v1/pulse/narratives",
).then((r) => r.json());
// narratives.narratives[] (id, title, summary, stage, momentum), narratives.charged

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

This example performs another automatic paid fetch to the external API, again using wallet-backed payment flow. The risk is not mere data transmission but the ability for copied sample code to authorize recurring paid calls in agentic contexts, potentially leading to unexpected spend or abuse if request frequency is not constrained.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 90)May include surrounding context.

// $0.03 — historical master digests, last 48h: const history = await fetchWithPay( "https://api.signalis.dev/v1/intelligence/history?hours=48&limit=10", ).then((r) => r.json());

text