T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:518- Finding
Hard-Coded Finix Sandbox API Credentials in Executable Examples
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 518–520, 551–553, and 590–592
Vulnerability Type: Hard-coded API credentials and unsafe command-line secret handling
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
The same HTTP Basic Auth credential is embedded in three executable
curlexamples:bash curl -i -X POST \ -u USfdccsr1Z5iVbXDyYt7hjZZ:313636f3-fac2-45a7-bff7-a334b93e7bda \ https://finix.sandbox-payments-api.com/identities \bash curl -i -X POST \ -u USfdccsr1Z5iVbXDyYt7hjZZ:313636f3-fac2-45a7-bff7-a334b93e7bda \ https://finix.sandbox-payments-api.com/payment_instruments \bash curl -i -X POST \ -u USfdccsr1Z5iVbXDyYt7hjZZ:313636f3-fac2-45a7-bff7-a334b93e7bda \ https://finix.sandbox-payments-api.com/transfers \The document later states that these are public Finix sandbox test credentials. That limits their apparent production impact, but does not eliminate the unsafe pattern.
Technical Analysis
The Skill embeds a realistic username/password pair directly in copyable commands despite declaring
FINIX_USERNAMEandFINIX_PASSWORDas environment requirements. Anyone who can read the Skill can retrieve and use the pair. If the credentials remain active, they may permit authenticated operations against the Finix sandbox API, including creating identities, claiming tokens as payment instruments, and submitting test transfers within the permissions and resources associated with that sandbox account.The
curl -u username:passwordpattern also encourages users to place credentials in shell command arguments. Commands are commonly retained in shell history, terminal transcripts, CI logs, support records, and audit telemetry. Depending on the operating system and timing, command arguments may also be visible to other local users through process inspection. Users who replace the example pair with production credentials could therefore expose materially sensitive secrets even though the embedded pair ...[truncated 2027 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the literal username/password pair from every example and revoke or rotate it if it was not intentionally designed for unrestricted public use.
- Use clearly nonfunctional placeholders in documentation, such as:
bash curl --user "${FINIX_USERNAME}" \ https://finix.sandbox-payments-api.com/identities - Warn that environment-variable expansion still places the expanded secret in the process argument list for many command-line patterns. Prefer a protected configuration file, secret manager, or server-side SDK mechanism that does not expose credentials in command arguments.
- Ensure credential-bearing files have restrictive permissions, are excluded from version control, and are never printed in application, CI, or HTTP logs.
- Use separate sandbox and production credentials, grant only the API permissions required by the integration, and rotate credentials periodically.
- Add explicit documentation that browser code must never receive
FINIX_USERNAMEorFINIX_PASSWORD; only the public Application ID and Merchant ID should be browser-visible. - Replace realistic tokens, identity IDs, payment-instrument IDs, and merchant IDs with unmistakably synthetic placeholders where executable realism is unnecessary.
- Add automated secret scanning to repository and publication workflows to reject credential-like values before release.
