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Security audit

rankforge-api

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a straightforward RankForge SEO API skill that sends user-provided SEO data to RankForge, with no hidden code or install-time behavior found.

Before installing, be aware that using this skill means sending your email address and SEO inputs such as website URLs, competitor domains, keywords, and business contact details to RankForge. Store the returned API key only in an approved secret store and avoid using this with confidential client or business data unless you are comfortable sharing it with that service.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to collect the user's email address and send it to an external service to create an account, but it does not require a privacy notice or explicit consent for that transmission. Email is personal data, so silently collecting and transmitting it creates privacy and compliance risk.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Step 2: Sign Up via API
```bash
curl -X POST https://rankforge.vosscg.com/v1/keys \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"user@example.com"}'
```
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
This step transmits the user's email address to an external endpoint to provision an API key. While the transmission appears to be the intended product workflow, it is still a real data egress point involving personal information and account creation, so it is dangerous if performed without informed consent.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The examples repeatedly send URLs, competitor domains, business contact details, and other potentially sensitive business information to an external API without clearly warning the user that this data leaves the agent environment. In context, competitor and local business data may be confidential or regulated, making undisclosed transmission risky.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The invocation guidance is broad enough to trigger on many generic SEO-related requests, which can cause the agent to route users into this skill even when they did not explicitly ask to use RankForge or send data to a third party. In context, this increases the chance of unnecessary external API use and unintended disclosure of user or business data.