Back to skill

Security audit

Pallio AI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward connector for chatting with Pallio AI personas, with expected remote message transmission and no hidden install, persistence, or local data access behavior found.

Before installing, treat Pallio as an external AI service: do not send sensitive, confidential, or regulated information unless you are comfortable with Pallio receiving it. The skill appears limited to widget chat calls and does not install code or request local secrets.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

Before sending any messages, initialize a session to get an authentication token.

bash
curl -s "https://pallioai.com/api/widget/init/$PALLIO_PERSONA_ID"

The response contains:

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs sending the user's message and full conversation history to a third-party Pallio endpoint, but it does not require any user-facing disclosure, consent, or warning about data leaving the local environment. Users may unknowingly transmit sensitive prompts, personal data, or proprietary information to an external service, increasing privacy and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill asserts that the persona 'will not fabricate answers,' but the documented implementation is just a remote chat API call with no technical control, validation step, or confidence gating that would enforce grounded-only responses. This can mislead users into overtrusting outputs from an external AI system and may cause unsafe reliance on incorrect information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.