T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:12- Finding
Unpinned and Unaudited Third-Party Package Installation
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 12–16
Vulnerability Type: Uncontrolled third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code
markdown ## Install ```bash pip install copilot-money-clitext ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs users to install an unofficial package directly from PyPI without pinning a reviewed version, verifying a cryptographic hash, identifying a trusted publisher, or providing the corresponding source code for audit. Because no implementation of `copilot-money-cli` is included in the project, the package's actual behavior and the documentation's security claims cannot be independently verified. An unqualified `pip install` resolves the package version at installation time, allowing the effective executable content to change after this skill has been reviewed. This creates a supply-chain trust boundary around a package that is expected to handle browser session tokens and sensitive personal financial information. A compromised publisher account, malicious future release, or package-name takeover could therefore introduce attacker-controlled code. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the PyPI publisher account, gains control of the package name, or causes a malicious release to be published. 2. A user follows the skill's installation instructions and runs `pip install copilot-money-cli`. 3. `pip` retrieves the currently resolved package release rather than a version and artifact reviewed with this skill. 4. Attacker-controlled package code executes during installation or when the CLI is invoked. 5. The malicious code can access data available to the user's local account, including any browser data and financial authentication tokens that the user subsequently authorizes the CLI to process. ### Impact Assessment Exploitation could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running `pip` or the CLI. The potent ...[truncated 393 chars]- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to a specifically reviewed version rather than installing the latest available release.
- Require installation with cryptographic hashes, such as a hash-locked requirements file using
pip --require-hashes. - Provide a link to the exact source revision corresponding to the pinned artifact and document the verified publisher identity.
- Include or vendor the executable implementation in the reviewed project when feasible.
- Publish reproducible-build or artifact-provenance information so users can verify that the distributed package matches the reviewed source.
- Run the CLI in an isolated environment with only the minimum filesystem and credential access required.
- Establish dependency monitoring and require a new security review before updating the pinned release.
