T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:36
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependencies## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 36-39 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party dependencies and insufficient supply-chain integrity controls **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```markdown ### Installation ```bash pip install requests wechatpy ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation command retrieves `requests` and `wechatpy` without specifying reviewed versions or validating package integrity with cryptographic hashes. Consequently, the exact code installed may change over time and depends on the configured Python package index, resolver behavior, and current dependency metadata. Python packages may run package-controlled build or installation logic, and their modules execute code when imported. If a named package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the configured package repository is compromised, following this instruction could introduce attacker-controlled code. The project provides no lock file, hash-verified requirements file, trusted-index restriction, or documented dependency review process. This finding does not establish that either named package is currently malicious. It identifies the absence of controls needed to make dependency installation reproducible and resistant to a future package or repository compromise. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a referenced package, one of its transitive dependencies, or a package source trusted by the victim's `pip` configuration. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that remains compatible with the unconstrained dependency specification. 3. A user follows the documented `pip install requests wechatpy` instruction. 4. The package resolver selects and downloads the attacker-controlled release. 5. Malicious code executes during package build or installation, or when the installed module is subsequently imported. 6. The code operates with the privileges and environmental access of the u ...[truncated 740 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every direct dependency to an exact, security-reviewed version. 2. Resolve and pin all transitive dependencies in a committed lock file. 3. Require cryptographic hashes for downloaded distributions, such as through a hash-locked requirements file and `pip install --require-hashes`. 4. Install only from explicitly configured, trusted package indexes over authenticated TLS; disable unintended supplemental indexes where dependency confusion is possible. 5. Regularly scan the lock file for known vulnerabilities and update dependencies through a controlled review and testing process. 6. Perform installation and execution inside a least-privileged virtual environment or isolated container, never as an administrator unless strictly required. 7. Document package provenance and verify that the imported `mp_assistant` implementation is supplied by the intended, reviewed project rather than relying on an ambiguous or unavailable module.