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Security audit

Quant Risk Dashboard

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent local quantitative risk dashboard, with normal but sensitive trading-data handling that users should configure carefully.

Before installing, use a virtual environment and preferably pin dependency versions. Do not configure ALERT_WEBHOOK unless you trust the destination, and avoid sending position, exposure, or P&L details to chat/webhook systems unless that is intended.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:63
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Installed Without Integrity Verification## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 63–67 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain risk from mutable, unverified dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium **Complete Code Snippet**: ```markdown ## Installation ```bash pip install pandas numpy scipy plotly dash ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command installs five third-party packages without version constraints, cryptographic hashes, or a lock file. Consequently, package resolution depends on the mutable state of the configured Python package index at installation time. Transitive dependencies are likewise neither pinned nor integrity-checked. Python package installation can execute package-controlled build or installation logic. If a listed package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the configured package index is compromised, following this command could execute attacker-controlled code. Installing unconstrained versions can also introduce future vulnerabilities or incompatible behavior that was not present during this audit. No evidence indicates that the named packages are currently malicious. The confirmed issue is the absence of dependency pinning and integrity controls, not the presence of an identified malicious dependency. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a listed package, a transitive dependency, a release artifact, or the package index configured in the user's pip environment. 2. The attacker publishes or substitutes a malicious version that satisfies the unconstrained dependency request. 3. A user follows the installation instructions and runs `pip install pandas numpy scipy plotly dash`. 4. Pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled artifact because no reviewed versions or hashes are enforced. 5. Malicious build, installation, or import-time code executes with the privileges of the user or automation account running pip. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the permissio ...[truncated 633 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Create a dependency manifest that pins every direct dependency to a reviewed version. 2. Generate and commit a lock file that records all transitive dependency versions. 3. Record cryptographic hashes for approved distributions and install with hash enforcement, for example: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 4. Generate hashes from artifacts obtained through a trusted package index and review dependency changes before updating the lock file. 5. Use a controlled internal package mirror or explicitly trusted index in production and CI/CD environments. 6. Run installation in an isolated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account. 7. Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning to CI. 8. Update `SKILL.md` so its installation instructions use the reviewed, hash-locked dependency file rather than unconstrained package names.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill includes example code that sends risk alert contents to an external webhook endpoint sourced from an environment variable, but provides no warning that portfolio or operational data may be transmitted off-system. In a trading risk dashboard context, alerts can contain sensitive position, drawdown, or exposure information, so normalizing this pattern without disclosure or controls can lead to unintended data leakage or exfiltration to untrusted destinations.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The user-facing summary formats portfolio values and risk metrics with the yen symbol, which imposes a specific locale/currency convention. The file does not provide an opt-in, configuration option, or justification that this dashboard is intended only for a Japan-specific context.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The example CLI output prints portfolio value and VaR with the yen symbol, again imposing a specific locale/currency without user opt-in. Because this is visible output rather than an internal calculation, it constitutes a natural-language locale policy concern under the stated rules.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.