T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:52- Finding
Unpinned and Unused Third-Party Dependencies Expand the Supply-Chain Attack Surface
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent local knowledge-base tool, but it promotes broad automatic capture and durable plaintext storage of conversations and files without enough consent, scoping, or retention controls.
Review this carefully before installing. Use it only for data you intentionally want retained in a local knowledge base, avoid enabling automatic conversation or folder capture without explicit consent from affected users, and do not point it at secrets, credentials, private mailboxes, or broad home directories. Install dependencies in an isolated environment and prefer pinned, reviewed package versions.
SKILL.md:52Unpinned and Unused Third-Party Dependencies Expand the Supply-Chain Attack Surface
meta_knowledge.py:126Potentially Sensitive Knowledge Is Persisted in Plaintext Without Explicit Restrictive Permissions
The skill explicitly advertises automatic capture from conversations, documents, emails, visited pages, and monitored folders without any privacy notice, consent flow, retention limits, or data minimization guidance. In a knowledge-base skill, this is especially dangerous because the core function is long-term aggregation and retrieval, which can silently accumulate sensitive personal, corporate, or credential-bearing information.
The OpenClaw hook example persists derived content from user messages after each interaction without notifying the user that their chat content may be stored for future retrieval. Because this occurs automatically in a post-message hook, users may reasonably assume the conversation is ephemeral when it is actually being converted into durable knowledge records.
The skill documents capabilities that read local files and ingest content from paths, URLs, emails, and watched folders, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. This creates a mismatch between advertised behavior and security controls, increasing the risk of over-broad file access or unauthorized persistence when the skill is deployed in an agent environment.
The example instructs automatic persistence of conversation-derived content into a knowledge base without defining consent, scope, sensitivity filtering, or minimization boundaries. Even though the stored content is a summarized form, it can still encode personal interests, confidential topics, or sensitive business context that may later be surfaced by search or Q&A features.
The add() path persists arbitrary user-provided content and metadata to disk via _save() without any consent prompt, visibility, retention control, or redaction step. In a self-building knowledge-base skill, this is especially risky because users may supply sensitive conversation content, secrets, or personal data that gets silently stored under a durable local path.
add_from_file() accepts an arbitrary local filepath, reads its contents, and ingests them into the knowledge base metadata and persistent storage without warning or access restrictions. In the context of a knowledge-capture agent, this increases the chance of exfiltrating or durably storing sensitive local files such as SSH keys, tokens, configs, or private documents if the skill is invoked on attacker-influenced paths.