T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Note
- Location
- SKILL.md:32
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:32` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned dependency installation **Risk Level**: Low **Vulnerable Code**: ```markdown Python 3.9+ with aiohttp: `pip install aiohttp` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instruction asks users to install `aiohttp` without specifying a reviewed version, dependency lockfile, or package integrity hash. Consequently, package resolution is mutable: the version installed depends on what the package index serves when the command is executed. No evidence indicates that `aiohttp` itself is malicious or that the project uses dependency confusion, typosquatting, or an untrusted package index. The risk is instead that a future compromised, malicious, or incompatible release could be installed automatically without further project changes or review. Transitive dependencies are likewise not locked. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the relevant package publishing account, package-index delivery path, or a transitive dependency. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release that satisfies the unrestricted package request. 3. A user follows the documented prerequisite and runs `pip install aiohttp`. 4. Pip resolves and installs the attacker-controlled release or dependency. 5. Malicious package installation hooks or imported runtime code execute with the privileges of the user running the command. This exploitation path is conditional on an upstream supply-chain compromise; the audited repository does not itself retrieve or execute a known malicious package. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary Python code under the installing or invoking user's account. The resulting scope could include access to files, environment variables, browser-debugging interfaces, local network services, and other resources available to that account. Administrative privileges are not inherently obtained unless the user runs p ...[truncated 41 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions - Pin `aiohttp` and all transitive dependencies to reviewed versions in a requirements or lock file. - Require package hashes, for example through a hash-locked `requirements.txt` installed with `pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt`. - Configure and document the expected trusted package index instead of relying on ambient pip configuration. - Use an isolated virtual environment and avoid installing dependencies with administrative privileges. - Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance monitoring. - Periodically update pinned versions through a controlled review and testing process rather than using an unrestricted latest release.
