T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
scripts/tradekix.sh:59- Finding
Unsafe JSON Construction Allows Request Manipulation and Configuration Corruption
- Content
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/dev/null || echo "") if [[ "$success" == "True" ]]; then api_key=$(echo "$response" | python3 -c "import json,sys; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['api_key'])") mkdir -p "$CONFIG_DIR" echo "{\"api_key\":\"$api_key\",\"email\":\"$email\",\"agent_name\":\"$name\"}" > "$CONFIG_FILE" ``` ### Technical Analysis The `name`, `email`, and optional `moltbook` command-line values are directly interpolated into a JSON string without being encoded by a JSON serializer. Consequently, quotation marks, backslashes, control characters, and JSON delimiters supplied in these values are treated as JSON syntax rather than field data. The same unsafe construction is used when writing `config.json`. The `api_key` from the remote response and the user-supplied email and agent name are inserted into JSON using shell string interpolation. A value containing JSON metacharacters can therefore create invalid configuration data or change its logical structure. This issue does not directly cause shell command execution because expanded shell variables are not reparsed as shell syntax. It does, however, cross the JSON data boundary unsafely and permits request manipulation and persistent configuration corruption. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker influences a value passed to `signup`, such as `--name`, `--email`, or `--moltbook`. 2. The attacker includes quotation marks and JSON syntax in that value, for example a sequence that terminates the intended string and adds another property ...[truncated 1053 chars]- Remediation
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