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Security audit

School Finder

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This school-search skill does what it says, but users should understand it sends location searches to Camino's API and its install examples are not pinned.

Install only the specific school-finder skill from a version or commit you trust, avoid pasting highly sensitive exact home or child-related locations unless necessary, and keep the Camino API key scoped and revocable. Treat the script as a remote API client, not a fully local school-search tool.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Installation Commands Create Supply-Chain Risk

Content
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Remediation
View remediation
install camino-school-finder npx skills add https://github.com/barneyjm/camino-skills# ``` ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/school-finder.sh:34
Finding

Unvalidated Parameters Permit URL Query Manipulation and Curl Glob Expansion

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

Add your key to Claude Code:

Add to your ~/.claude/settings.json:

json
{

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill documents shell-based execution paths using curl/jq and script invocation, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That increases the chance an agent will run shell commands with broader-than-necessary access, making misuse or unintended command execution harder to constrain.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

Using npx skills add without a pinned version makes installation non-reproducible and exposes users to supply-chain risk if the upstream package changes or is compromised. A future package version could execute unexpected code during install or alter skill behavior silently.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

This installation command also references npx skills without version pinning, so users may fetch whatever the latest package resolves to at install time. That creates a preventable supply-chain exposure during skill installation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

npx clawhub@latest explicitly tracks the newest published version, which maximizes exposure to malicious or breaking upstream changes. For an installation path, this is a classic supply-chain hardening gap.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill is specifically built to send user-provided addresses, queries, and coordinates to a remote Camino API, yet it does not prominently warn users that sensitive location data leaves the local environment. Because home, school, and commute searches can reveal highly sensitive routines and minors-related context, the absence of a clear privacy notice increases privacy and compliance risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly sends queries and precise coordinates to https://api.getcamino.ai/, which is an external transmission of potentially sensitive location data. This is expected for the skill's function, but it still creates privacy risk if users are unaware or if highly sensitive addresses are submitted.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.getcamino.ai/query?query=schools&lat=40.7589&lon=-73.9851&radius=2000&rank=true"

Parameters

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/school-finder.sh (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

sh
curl -s -X GET \
    -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
    -H "X-Client: claude-code-skill" \
    "https://api.getcamino.ai/query?${QUERY_STRING}" | jq .

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.