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Security audit

Route

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to provide routing as advertised, but its mutable install instructions and sensitive location-data handling should be reviewed before use.

Install only from a reviewed, pinned source if possible, and avoid the all-skills install unless you intend to trust the entire Camino suite. Do not submit home, work, live, or otherwise sensitive locations unless you are comfortable sending those coordinates and optional imagery requests to Camino's API under your API key.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Installers Create a Supply-Chain Execution Risk

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/route.sh:37
Finding

Unvalidated and Unencoded Input Permits Authenticated Query-Parameter Injection

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (8)

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

Add your key to Claude Code:

Add to your ~/.claude/settings.json:

json
{

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs use of shell-based capabilities (curl, jq, and local scripts) but does not declare a restrictive tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. In an agent environment, undeclared shell capability increases the chance the skill can run broader commands than users expect, reducing transparency and weakening sandbox policy review.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Using npx skills add https://github.com/barneyjm/camino-skills without a pinned commit, tag, or package version creates a supply-chain risk because future upstream changes could alter the installed skill behavior. A user may install a different artifact than the one reviewed, including potentially malicious updates.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The specific-skill install example still references an unpinned GitHub source, so it has the same supply-chain exposure as the broader repo install. Because users are encouraged to copy-paste the command, they may unknowingly trust mutable remote content.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

npx clawhub@latest install camino-route pulls the latest installer version at runtime, which is mutable and can change behavior unexpectedly. This introduces supply-chain and reproducibility risk, especially for a tool that installs agent skills with code-execution capability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This routing skill sends precise origin and destination coordinates to an external API, but the skill description does not clearly warn users that their location data leaves the local environment. That omission can cause unintentional disclosure of sensitive travel patterns, home/work addresses, or live movement data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill performs external transmission to https://api.getcamino.ai/route, including precise geolocation inputs and an API key header. Even though this is core to the skill's purpose, it remains a real security/privacy concern because sensitive location data is sent to a third party and could be logged, retained, or mishandled.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 87)May include surrounding context.

bash
curl -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
  "https://api.getcamino.ai/route?start_lat=40.7128&start_lon=-74.0060&end_lat=40.7589&end_lon=-73.9851&mode=car"

Parameters

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/route.sh (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

sh
curl -s -X GET \
    -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
    -H "X-Client: claude-code-skill" \
    "https://api.getcamino.ai/route?${QUERY_STRING}" | jq .

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.