Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This parking-search skill is purpose-aligned and disclosed, but users should understand it sends searches, optional coordinates, and an API key to Camino's remote service.
Install only from a source and version you trust, avoid running the broad companion-suite install unless you want all related skills, and treat parking searches or exact coordinates as data shared with Camino's API under your CAMINO_API_KEY.
SKILL.md:11Unpinned Remote Installation Dependencies
scripts/parking-finder.sh:42Unvalidated and Unencoded URL Query Parameters
Skill reads from agent configuration directories (.claude/, .codex/, .gemini/). These directories may contain API keys, personal settings, and other credentials that the skill has no legitimate need to access.
Add your key to Claude Code:
Add to your ~/.claude/settings.json:
{
The skill clearly instructs users to run shell commands and use a shell script, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as allowed shell tools or permissions. This weakens least-privilege controls and makes it harder for a host agent to constrain execution safely, increasing the risk of unintended command execution if the skill is expanded or modified.
Using npx skills add against a remote GitHub repository without pinning a specific commit, tag, or package version creates a supply-chain risk. A future repository change, compromise, or malicious update could cause users to install different code than expected.
This installation command again references a remote repository through npx skills add without version pinning. Because the fetched content can change over time, users may unknowingly install modified or malicious skill definitions.
Invoking npx clawhub@latest install pulls the latest available package version at execution time, which is not reproducible and exposes users to upstream package compromise or breaking changes. This is a classic package supply-chain exposure because trust is placed in whatever version is current at install time.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
"https://api.getcamino.ai/query?query=parking+garages+lots&lat=40.7505&lon=-73.9934&radius=1000&rank=true"
The script transmits user-provided search queries and optional precise location data (lat/lon) to a third-party remote API, but the execution path provides no user-facing disclosure or consent prompt at the time of transmission. In a skill context, this can expose sensitive destination or whereabouts information unexpectedly, especially if callers assume processing is local.
This script performs an external network request to api.getcamino.ai containing the assembled query string, which may include user search terms and optional latitude/longitude values. While the transmission appears intentional and over HTTPS, it is still a real data-exposure boundary and becomes risky if users are not clearly informed that potentially sensitive location data leaves the local environment.
curl -s -X GET \
-H "X-API-Key: $CAMINO_API_KEY" \
-H "X-Client: claude-code-skill" \
"https://api.getcamino.ai/query?${QUERY_STRING}" | jq .
No suspicious patterns detected.