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Security audit

Lemonade Server Manager

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill does what it says, but it can send prompts and API keys to local or remote servers over plain HTTP and can change model/resource state.

Install only if you trust the Lemonade server endpoints you will use. Prefer localhost or HTTPS remote URLs, avoid sending sensitive prompts to untrusted servers, and treat pull/load/unload commands as state-changing operations that can consume disk, bandwidth, and accelerator memory.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:25
Finding

API credentials and inference data may be transmitted to remote servers over plaintext HTTP

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:25-28, 38-42
Additional Affected Locations: The same plaintext HTTP and authorization-header pattern is repeated in the API examples throughout SKILL.md.
Vulnerability Type: Transmission of sensitive information over an insecure channel
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
1. Every endpoint requires a base `server_url`. If one is not specified by the user, assume `http://localhost:8000`.
2. Use the `LEMONADE_API_KEY` environment variable to authenticate.
3. This skill stays focused on making HTTP requests to a base `server_url` (default `http://localhost:8000`) and using an optional `LEMONADE_API_KEY`. It does not instruct reading arbitrary host files or other env vars.
4. **Operational note:** The skill will transmit prompts and model requests to whichever `server_url` is used. If a remote URL is supplied, the agent will send user content and model commands there (expected for this skill, but worth the user's attention).

## API Operations

### System Info

Get hardware capabilities and device enumeration limits.

**Returns:** JSON object with hardware capabilities.

```bash
# Example Request
curl -X GET "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/system-info" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${LEMONADE_API_KEY}"
text

### Technical Analysis

The skill supports user-selected local or remote server URLs and instructs the agent to attach the `LEMONADE_API_KEY` bearer token to HTTP requests. It does not require TLS for non-loopback destinations, validate the destination, or instruct the agent to reject plaintext remote URLs. The examples consistently normalize the use of the `http://` scheme.

Plaintext HTTP provides neither confidentiality nor server authentication. When this pattern is used with a remote server, a network-positioned attacker can observe or modify the request and capture the bearer token. An attacker who persuades a user to selec
...[truncated 1677 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Require https:// for every non-loopback server URL. Permit plaintext HTTP only for explicitly recognized loopback destinations such as localhost, 127.0.0.1, and [::1].
  2. Validate the URL before making a request. Reject unsupported schemes, embedded credentials, malformed hosts, and unexpected redirects.
  3. Do not forward the Authorization header across redirects or to a host different from the one explicitly approved by the user. Prefer disabling redirects unless they are required.
  4. Ask for explicit user confirmation before sending credentials, prompts, or model-management commands to a new remote origin.
  5. Maintain an allowlist of trusted Lemonade server origins where feasible.
  6. Omit the Authorization header entirely when LEMONADE_API_KEY is unset or empty.
  7. Replace remote HTTP examples with HTTPS examples and clearly document that TLS certificate validation must not be disabled.
  8. Use narrowly scoped, short-lived API credentials and rotate any credential suspected of having traversed plaintext HTTP.
  9. Consider separating read-only monitoring credentials from credentials allowed to pull, load, or unload models.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly encourages remote server interaction, model pulling/loading, and resource-management actions but does not warn about the operational and security consequences of contacting arbitrary hosts, consuming bandwidth/storage, or disrupting running workloads. In an agent skill context, these examples can normalize impactful network and system actions without clear consent boundaries, increasing the chance of unintended changes to remote infrastructure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Example Request
curl -X GET "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/system-info" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer ${LEMONADE_API_KEY}"