T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
API credentials and inference data may be transmitted to remote servers over plaintext HTTP
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:25-28, 38-42
Additional Affected Locations: The same plaintext HTTP and authorization-header pattern is repeated in the API examples throughoutSKILL.md.
Vulnerability Type: Transmission of sensitive information over an insecure channel
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown 1. Every endpoint requires a base `server_url`. If one is not specified by the user, assume `http://localhost:8000`. 2. Use the `LEMONADE_API_KEY` environment variable to authenticate. 3. This skill stays focused on making HTTP requests to a base `server_url` (default `http://localhost:8000`) and using an optional `LEMONADE_API_KEY`. It does not instruct reading arbitrary host files or other env vars. 4. **Operational note:** The skill will transmit prompts and model requests to whichever `server_url` is used. If a remote URL is supplied, the agent will send user content and model commands there (expected for this skill, but worth the user's attention). ## API Operations ### System Info Get hardware capabilities and device enumeration limits. **Returns:** JSON object with hardware capabilities. ```bash # Example Request curl -X GET "http://localhost:8000/api/v1/system-info" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer ${LEMONADE_API_KEY}"text ### Technical Analysis The skill supports user-selected local or remote server URLs and instructs the agent to attach the `LEMONADE_API_KEY` bearer token to HTTP requests. It does not require TLS for non-loopback destinations, validate the destination, or instruct the agent to reject plaintext remote URLs. The examples consistently normalize the use of the `http://` scheme. Plaintext HTTP provides neither confidentiality nor server authentication. When this pattern is used with a remote server, a network-positioned attacker can observe or modify the request and capture the bearer token. An attacker who persuades a user to selec ...[truncated 1677 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Require
https://for every non-loopback server URL. Permit plaintext HTTP only for explicitly recognized loopback destinations such aslocalhost,127.0.0.1, and[::1]. - Validate the URL before making a request. Reject unsupported schemes, embedded credentials, malformed hosts, and unexpected redirects.
- Do not forward the
Authorizationheader across redirects or to a host different from the one explicitly approved by the user. Prefer disabling redirects unless they are required. - Ask for explicit user confirmation before sending credentials, prompts, or model-management commands to a new remote origin.
- Maintain an allowlist of trusted Lemonade server origins where feasible.
- Omit the
Authorizationheader entirely whenLEMONADE_API_KEYis unset or empty. - Replace remote HTTP examples with HTTPS examples and clearly document that TLS certificate validation must not be disabled.
- Use narrowly scoped, short-lived API credentials and rotate any credential suspected of having traversed plaintext HTTP.
- Consider separating read-only monitoring credentials from credentials allowed to pull, load, or unload models.
- Require
