Tainted flow: 'feedback_log' from os.environ.get (line 1076, credential/environment) → open (file write)
Medium
- Category
- Data Flow
- Content
feedback_log = STORE_DIR / "feedback.log" ensure_dirs() timestamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() with open(feedback_log, "a", encoding="utf-8") as f: f.write(f"\n--- {timestamp} ---\n{message}\n{sys_info}\n") # Build GitHub issue URL- Confidence
- 78% confidence
- Finding
- The write target is derived from WEB_MONITOR_DIR, an environment-controlled path, and the program appends feedback content there without validating the location. In contexts where an attacker can influence the environment or execution wrapper, this can cause writes outside the intended application directory, potentially overwriting or planting files accessible to the current user.
