T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:245- Finding
Unbounded User-Controlled Token and Concurrency Consumption
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill openly burns a user's OpenClaw tokens, but its high-concurrency mode lacks firm limits and reliable stopping controls, so installation deserves careful review.
Install only if you intentionally want an agent to spend OpenClaw tokens. Avoid the ddos mode unless you have explicit budget and rate-limit approval, and do not rely on the documented stop command or token estimates as hard safeguards.
SKILL.md:245Unbounded User-Controlled Token and Concurrency Consumption
SKILL.md:359Advertised Cancellation Mechanism Is Not Implemented
SKILL.md:426Unlimited Exception Retries Can Leave Concurrent Mode Running Indefinitely
SKILL.md:442Model-Controlled Token Accounting Can Bypass the Requested Consumption Target
The README explicitly promotes a 'DDoS' high-concurrency mode that uses multiple subagents to rapidly consume resources, framed as an attack and capable of generating excessive traffic and billing. Even if the nominal target is the platform's own LLM quota, normalizing attack semantics and encouraging parallelized load generation creates abuse potential against shared infrastructure and can cause unbounded cost or service degradation.
The skill uses playful religious framing to normalize and disguise an explicitly named 'DDoS' mode, lowering user skepticism around abusive resource-exhaustion behavior. This contextual masking makes the capability more dangerous because it packages harmful operational guidance as entertainment rather than clearly labeling it as disallowed or unsafe.
Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.
elif mode == "toworld":
# TTS 播放
import subprocess
subprocess.run(["say", response[:100]], check=False)
# tollm 模式静默
# 检查停止信号
These steps escalate from benign token use into coordinated concurrent subagent spawning designed to maximize throughput and continue until a target is exhausted. The staged instructions operationalize distributed resource consumption, which is dangerous in context because the skill's stated goal is to burn tokens as fast as possible rather than accomplish a legitimate user task.
The ddos mode is an explicit high-concurrency resource exhaustion mechanism that spawns multiple subagents to maximize token burn and throughput. In context, this is not incidental complexity but operational guidance for coordinated overconsumption of shared LLM/API resources, potentially causing account depletion, rate-limit pressure, and service abuse.
The skill strongly encourages high-concurrency token consumption and even labels it as DDoS behavior, while downplaying financial and infrastructure risk in the prominent marketing section. In context, this is more dangerous because the skill's core purpose is deliberate resource burning, so missing upfront warnings materially increases the chance of accidental overage, platform abuse, or denial-of-service against shared systems.
The trigger examples encourage immediate use of background, TTS, and concurrent modes directly from chat without sufficiently visible notice of their side effects, including hidden token spend, host interaction, and potential overshoot. Because these commands are presented as easy one-liners, users may invoke powerful behaviors without understanding the operational or cost consequences.
Advertising system-level TTS execution expands the skill from simple token consumption into host interaction by invoking platform speech utilities such as say, PowerShell, or espeak. That added capability increases the attack surface and can be abused for unwanted command execution paths, disruptive behavior, or environment-specific side effects unrelated to the stated purpose.
The README markets precise real-time token accounting and target-based stopping, yet the concurrent mode later admits 10-30% overshoot due to stop delays. For a cost-burning tool, this discrepancy is security-relevant because users may be induced to authorize spending under false precision, leading to unexpected charges or resource exhaustion.
The trigger phrases are broad and overlap with ordinary conversation, making accidental activation more likely. In this skill, accidental activation is especially risky because the resulting behavior intentionally consumes paid tokens and may start repeated or concurrent LLM calls without meaningful user confirmation.
The skill describes a high-concurrency token-burning mode without a clear warning that it can rapidly deplete quotas, trigger rate limits, and spawn multiple billable subagents. Lack of prominent safety disclosure materially increases the chance of misuse and unexpected financial or operational impact.
The documentation promises adaptive throttling on 429/rate-limit errors, but the implementation only performs a brief generic sleep and never reduces concurrency or adjusts pacing. This mismatch is dangerous because users may rely on claimed safeguards that do not exist while the skill continues stressing upstream services.
The skill invokes a local TTS subprocess using model-generated text, which expands behavior beyond simple token consumption into host-side command execution. Although the argument list use reduces classic shell injection risk, it still allows untrusted LLM output to drive OS-level actions and may create abuse, privacy, or nuisance effects on the host.
The document claims that a user can immediately stop the running task, but the supplied code does not actually implement a reliable stop path tied to user input. For a loop designed to intentionally consume tokens, missing stop handling increases the risk of runaway usage, unexpected spend, and inability to halt harmful behavior promptly.
The instructions tell users to input Chinese trigger phrases such as "攒功德" and "停止攒功德" and do not mention alternative language options. This can constitute a locale/language policy issue because the skill appears to force a specific language without user opt-in or explanation.
The work-principle section says the agent loads 7 sutras into memory, while later sections claim a 996-text corpus with random non-repeating selection. The FAQ then says repetition is normal due to finite books, contradicting the '永不重复' claim and creating inconsistent documentation about what content is actually used.
The skill description, triggers, prompts, and examples are all written as Chinese-only instructions and phrases, with no indication that users may interact in other languages or opt into a locale-specific mode. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user choice can be a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is documented and justified.